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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Until recently, most major commercial and investment banks did not consider environmental 
and social concerns to be particularly relevant to their operations. Today, however, they and 
their key stakeholders agree that financiers bear significant responsibility for the environmental 
and social impacts of the operations they finance.  
 
Within the banking sector, addressing environmental and social issues is now considered critical 
to the proper management of transaction, portfolio and reputational risks. The question is no 
longer whether commercial banks should address the sustainable development aspects of the 
activities they support, but how they should do it – what substantive standards should they 
apply? How should they implement them? And how should they assure compliance? 
 
The banking sector’s emerging recognition of environmental and social responsibility was 
driven to a large degree by outside pressures. Beginning in 2000, environmental organisations 
such as Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) challenged the 
industry with high-profile campaigns that highlighted cases in which commercial banks were 
“bankrolling disasters”. In 2002, a global coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
including FoE, RAN, WWF-UK and the Berne Declaration came together to promote 
sustainable finance in the commercial sector. This informal network subsequently evolved into 
BankTrack, whose vision for a sustainable finance sector was expressed in the Collevecchio 
Declaration of January 2003. Now endorsed by more than 200 organisations, the Collevecchio 
Declaration remains the benchmark by which civil society will measure the banking sector’s 
commitment to sustainable development.  
 
Collevecchio Declaration Commitments  
 
1. Commitment to sustainability  
2. Commitment to ‘do no harm’ 
3. Commitment to responsibility 
4. Commitment to accountability 
5. Commitment to transparency 
6. Commitment to sustainable markets and governance 
 
WWF-UK and BankTrack* are publishing this report to help answer those difficult questions 
and to evaluate how the various commercial and investment banks are responding. The report’s 
primary objective is to review the current (September 2005) environmental and social policies 
adopted by key institutions in the banking sector. This report reviews the publicly available 
environmental and social policies of 39 banks from around the world, chosen for their high 
visibility and global reach, their substantial presence in project finance markets, and/or their 
endorsement of the Equator Principles. 
 
The Equator Principles provide a framework for banks to review, evaluate and mitigate or avoid 
environmental and social impacts and risks associated with projects they finance. The Principles 
are based on the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC’s) environmental and social 
safeguard policies. By December 2005, the number of signatories to the Principles had grown 
from the original 10 leading banks to 36. Together, the Equator Banks are responsible for 
arranging well over 75 per cent of worldwide project loans by volume. While adoption of the 
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Equator Principles has been a welcome development, it marks only the beginning of the path to 
sustainable finance. The Principles suffer from a number of serious flaws (which are highlighted 
in the full report) that limit their effectiveness both as an integrated policy response to 
environment and social concerns and as an effective tool for the banks to manage their risks. 
The report provides a detailed analysis of how these banks’ policies compare with each other, 
and, more important, how they compare with international rights, standards and best practice. 
 
When it was conceived, this report also had a secondary objective – to assess the 
implementation and application of the sustainable development policies adopted by the banks. 
However, a comprehensive evaluation was foreclosed by the near total lack of information the 
banks have placed in the public domain. Their lack of transparency regarding implementation 
not only makes independent evaluation impossible, but also leaves them open to legitimate 
charges of “greenwash”; they are adopting environmental rhetoric with little commitment to 
changing their performance. 
 
Methodology 
This study reviews the publicly available environmental and social policies of 39 banks from 
around the world. They were chosen because of their high visibility and global reach, their 
important presence in global project finance markets, and/or their endorsement of the Equator 
Principles.  
 
We reviewed all the environmental and social policies and annual sustainability reports made 
publicly available by the banks. The study was based on policies available at the time, although 
we are aware of other policies in the final drafting stages such as a mining policy at HSBC and a 
dams policy at ABN AMRO.  
 
We invited all the banks to participate in this survey. Based on the information they provided, 
we assessed their policies in 13 substantive areas of particular environmental or social concern: 
 
• human rights;  
• labour rights; 
• indigenous people;  
• climate and energy; 
• dams; 
• biodiversity; 
• forests; 
• fisheries;  
• extractive industries; 
• sustainable agriculture; 
• chemicals;  
• transparency and reporting by the clients; and 
• environmental and social management systems. 
 
The banks’ policies and procedures were evaluated against independent benchmarks from two 
categories of sources. First and most important, we considered the rights and standards 
embodied in widely accepted international conventions, treaties, codes, action plans and other 
hard and soft law instruments. Next, we considered sectoral “best practice” standards – 
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particularly those developed through participatory, multi-stakeholder processes that included 
government and industry representatives, and that are therefore widely viewed as authoritative 
and legitimate.   
 
In addition to a narrative analysis of the banks’ policies, we scored each bank from 0 to 4 in 
order to provide a snapshot comparison of bank policies in each sector. This rating system also 
allows for evaluating changes and trends over time, as the commercial sector responds to the 
challenge of environmental and social sustainability. In general, the scoring reflects the 
following system:  
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
The discernible shift in recent years that many banks have made towards addressing 
environmental and sustainability impacts of their operations is a welcome and important first 
step on the path to sustainable finance. The end of that path, however, will be measured not by 
good intentions or even by strong paper policies. Sustainable finance must seek improved 
performance and results on the ground in affected communities and environments. This can only 
be achieved through the adoption of strong policy frameworks, transparently and effectively 
implemented across all portfolios and departments.  
 
POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
As this review demonstrates, a growing number of banks are developing sector-specific policies 
that apply to transactions. Some were developed prior to the Equator Principles, while others 
were developed in part as a response to the Principles and thus reflect the Principles’ inherent 
limitations. The increasing development, scope and diversity of policies is welcomed and 
provides significant promise for stronger policy frameworks in the future. 
 
As our analysis indicates, with few exceptions bank policies are lagging significantly behind 
relevant international standards and best practices (see Table 1). The average numerical grades 
can be translated into a letter grade according to the following scale: 
 
0.00 to 0.50 E  2.26 to 2.50 C+ 
0.51 to 0.75 D-  2.51 to 2.75 B- 
0.76 to 1.25 D  2.76 to 3.25 B 
1.26 to 1.50 D+  3.26 to 3.50 B+ 
1.51 to 1.75 C-  3.51 to 3.75 A- 
1.76 to 2.25 C   3.76 to 4.00 A 
Box 1: Scoring system for evaluating bank policies 
 
0 No publicly available policy addressing the subject. 
1 Vaguely worded or “aspirational” policy with no clear commitments. 
2 Some clear commitments, but no part of the policy meets relevant international 
 standards. 
3 Some parts of the policy meet international standards, but other parts are either absent, 
vague or below relevant international standards. 
4 All, or nearly all, of the policy meets or is in line with relevant international standards. 
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Where banks have adopted specific policies, they are frequently aspirational and contain little 
language that can be actioned. In only two cases – Rabobank’s adoption of the UN Draft Norms 
on Human Rights and HSBC’s adoption of the World Commission on Dams standards – has any 
bank adopted policies that meet all or most of the relevant international standards or best 
practices. 
 
The highest overall average score, achieved by ABN AMRO and HSBC Group, was a 1.31, 
which if translated to a letter grade is a D+.   
 
Table 1:  Summary of Policy Ratings 
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ABN AMRO  3 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0 2 0 2 1 1.31 (D+) 
Banco Bradesco  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Banco de Brasil 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54  (D-) 
Banco Itaú  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Barclays  1 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0.77  (D) 
BBVA  0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
BNDES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (E) 
BNP Paribas  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
Bank of 
America  
0 0 1 3 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.85 (D) 
Calyon  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
CIBC  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Citigroup  0 3 1 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1.00 (D) 
Credit Suisse 
Group  
0 1 1  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
Deutsche Bank  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
Dexia  0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
Dresdner Bank  0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
HBOS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
HSBC Group  0 1 1 1 4 2 3 0 0 0 2 2 1 1.31 (D+) 
HVB Group 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
ING Group  1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.62 (D-) 
JP Morgan 
Chase 
0 1 3 3 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 2 1 1.23 (D) 
KBC  0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (E) 
Korean Dev. 
Bank  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (E) 
Manulife  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
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MCC  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi  
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
Mizuho 
Financial Group  
0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Rabobank 
Group  
4 3 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1.15 (D) 
Royal Bank of 
Canada 
0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland  
0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-)  
Scotia Bank  0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-)  
Société Général  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 (E) 
Standard 
Chartered Bank  
1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
Sumitomo 
Mitsui Financial 
Group 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (E) 
UBS  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
Unibanco  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E)  
Wells Fargo 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
West LB 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E)  
Westpac 3 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.77 (D-) 
 
Some banks are also taking tentative steps to apply the policies to all or most of their operations. 
Although we recognise that the application of environmental and social policies may need to be 
tailored to different financial products and services, we expect these policies to apply 
throughout the banking industry to all relevant activities. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the revision of the IFC’s safeguard policy framework means 
significant changes for the policies underlying the Equator Principles. Before adopting the IFC’s 
new Performance Standards system, the Equator Banks should evaluate it carefully and 
proactively address the weaknesses and gaps in the IFC’s new approach by adopting the 
international standards and best practice set out in this report. Unfortunately, research suggests 
that only a small minority of Equator Banks have taken steps to supplement the inadequate 
policy framework of the Principles by adopting additional standards, let alone standards that 
meet international norms and best practice. 
 
TRANSPARENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION  
Even where banks have the best policies, little information is available about their systems or 
practices for implementation. It was therefore impossible to assess, let alone compare, their 
efforts at implementation. We know anecdotally that significant efforts are being made. We also 
know that even banks with relatively strong policies continue to support transactions with 
significant environmental or social impacts. This practice cannot continue without eroding the 
credibility of all banks committed to sustainable finance. 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
As we have now shifted from a “trust me” to a “show me” world in which corporations are the 
least trusted of institutions, banks should urgently adopt a reporting framework that 
demonstrates that they are actually implementing their policies in ways that make a meaningful 
difference to people and the planet. Only then will outside stakeholders gain confidence that the 
banking sector’s policy pronouncements are more than just rhetoric.  
 
We suggest that banks report on their implementation by publishing annual sustainability 
reports in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative, with particular reference to the 
emerging financial services sector supplement. This reporting protocol is currently in draft form 
and incomplete in scope; however, we hope that as it is finalised, and as technical protocols and 
implementation guides are developed, it will provide a comprehensive reporting framework for 
banks and stakeholders alike. 
 
ADOPTING AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Of course, reporting on implementation simply ensures that banks are putting in place an 
effective environmental and social risk management system that reflects all potential impacts 
across all their activities. Each bank needs to adopt an environmental management system 
(EMS) that includes the following elements: 
 
• Initial review to determine key environmental and social exposures, impacts and risks; 
• overall environmental and social policy that sets the bank’s approach; 
• annual action plans; 
• committed organisational structure and personnel (staffing, oversight, compensation and 
training); 
• environmental and social procedures and standards for transactions that include deal-
level transparency, consultation and compliance procedures; 
• documentation, including that required to facilitate implementation audits; 
• internal information and training; 
• external reporting, verification and consultation; 
• EMS monitoring and corrective action; and 
• management review and improvement, feeding back into the cycle and informing 
annual action plans. 
 
In addition, banks should provide for the use of external transparency, compliance and 
accountability mechanisms for especially sensitive transactions. For banks that have agreed to a 
collective set of standards and procedures (the Equator Principles, for example), such a system 
could be applied collectively; this would include common information disclosure and reporting 
requirements, and a shared system for receiving third-party complaints from external actors. 
 
EXERCISING LEADERSHIP IN SUSTAINABLE FINANCE 
Banks committed to sustainable finance must also exercise leadership in the sector and in 
society generally. This report has identified some examples of this, including HSBC’s role in 
achieving carbon neutrality, and Rabobank’s role in supporting the Responsible Commodities 
Initiative. In addition, the banks must assert their leadership through the syndications or 
arrangements with other banks that have yet to join the sustainable finance movement. This will 
be increasingly important over time as banks from China and other developing countries that 
have no experience yet in sustainable finance become increasingly major players. Finally, to be 
recognised leaders in sustainable finance, the banks must also ensure that they do not use their 
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political influence to circumvent or undermine the development of regulatory and other 
approaches to sustainable development. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While some industry leaders have begun to infuse their operations with broad-based 
commitments to sustainability, even they (let alone the rest of the industry) still have far to go in 
terms of meeting international standards and best practices. If the financial industry is to be a 
reliable, effective and profitable catalyst for sustainable development, it must not only adopt 
strong and comprehensive policies, but must also introduce comprehensive risk management 
systems that ensure rigorous implementation of the policies. At this point, policy development is 
still too embryonic, and information about implementation too guarded, for us to determine 
whether the banking industry has crossed the threshold into a promising new era of green 
finance – or merely refined the discredited old tools of “greenwash”.   
 
* BankTrack is a global coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) including WWF-
UK, Friends of the Earth, the Rainforest Action Network and the Berne Declaration. It promotes 
sustainable finance in the commercial sector, and its vision for a sustainable finance sector was 
expressed in the Collevecchio Declaration of January 2003. Now endorsed by more than 200 
organisations, the Collevecchio Declaration remains the benchmark by which civil society will 
measure the banking sector’s commitment to sustainable development. 
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“If financial institutions don’t understand and reward sustainable behaviour, progress in developing more 
sustainable business practices will be slow” –   
Bjorn Stigson, President of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, most major commercial banks did not consider environmental and social 
concerns to be particularly relevant to their operations. Their environmental and social policies 
– to the extent that they had them – related almost exclusively to internal concerns such as 
recycling, waste management and employee relations. Today, however, the leading commercial 
banks agree that they bear significant responsibility for the environmental and social impacts of 
the operations they finance. Within the banking sector, addressing environmental and social 
issues is now considered critical to the proper management of project, portfolio and reputational 
risks. The question is no longer whether commercial banks should address the sustainable 
development aspects of the activities they support, but how they should do it – what substantive 
standards should they apply? How should they implement them? And how should they assure 
compliance? 
 
The banking sector’s emerging recognition of environmental and social responsibility was 
driven to a large degree by outside pressures. Beginning in 2000, environmental organisations 
such as Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) challenged the 
industry with high-profile campaigns that highlighted cases in which commercial banks were 
“bankrolling disasters”. In 2002, a global coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
including FoE, RAN, WWF-UK and the Berne Declaration came together to promote 
sustainable finance in the commercial sector. This informal network subsequently evolved into 
BankTrack,1 whose vision for a sustainable finance sector was expressed in the Collevecchio 
Declaration of January 2003. Now endorsed by more than 200 organisations, the Collevecchio 
Declaration remains the benchmark by which civil society will measure the banking sector’s 
commitment to sustainable development. See Box 2. 
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Box 2:  Collevecchio Declaration Commitments  
 
1. Commitment to sustainability  
Financial institutions (FIs) must expand their missions from ones that prioritise profit 
maximisation to a vision of social and environmental sustainability. A commitment to 
sustainability would require FIs to fully integrate the consideration of ecological limits, 
social equity and economic justice into corporate strategies and core business areas 
(including credit, investing, underwriting, advising), so that sustainability objectives are 
placed on an equal footing with shareholder maximisation and client satisfaction; and to 
strive to finance transactions that promote sustainability.  
 
2. Commitment to ‘do no harm’ 
FIs should commit to do no harm by preventing and minimising the environmentally 
and/or socially detrimental impacts of their portfolios and their operations. FIs should 
create policies, procedures and standards based on the Precautionary Principle to 
minimise environmental and social harm, improve social and environmental conditions 
where they and their clients operate, and avoid involvement in transactions that 
undermine sustainability. 
 
3. Commitment to responsibility 
FIs should bear full responsibility for the environmental and social impacts of their 
transactions. They must also pay their full and fair share of the risks they accept and 
create. These include financial risks, as well as social and environmental costs that are 
borne by communities. 
 
4. Commitment to accountability 
FIs must be accountable to their stakeholders, particularly those that are affected by the 
activities of the companies they finance. Accountability means that stakeholders must 
have an influential voice in financial decisions that affect the quality of their 
environments and their lives through ensuring that stakeholders’ rights are protected by 
law, and through practices and procedures voluntarily adopted by the FI.  
 
5. Commitment to transparency 
FIs must be transparent to stakeholders, not only through robust, regular and 
standardised disclosure, but also through being responsive to stakeholder needs for 
specialised information on FIs’ policies, procedures and transactions. Commercial 
confidentiality should not be used as an excuse to deny stakeholders information. 
 
6. Commitment to sustainable markets and governance 
FIs should ensure that markets are more capable of fostering sustainability by 
supporting public policy, regulatory and/or market mechanisms which facilitate 
sustainability and foster the full cost accounting of social and environmental 
externalities. 
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Governments and intergovernmental organisations have made similar calls for a shift towards 
“sustainable finance”. In the early 1990s, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
launched what is now known as the UNEP Finance Initiative. This is a “global partnership” 
between UNEP and more than 170 companies in the finance sector to understand the 
environmental and social dimension of financial performance and risk. And in 2002, the United 
Kingdom unveiled the London Principles on Sustainable Finance. These seven principles 
addressed the environmental and social impact of the financial sector and emphasised such 
issues as transparency, risk management and equitable access to capital.2 
 
Although several banks had already adopted environmental and social policies, commercial 
banks took their first significant step towards developing a common set of environmental and 
social standards in June 2003 with the launch of the Equator Principles. The Equator Principles 
provide a framework for banks to review, evaluate and mitigate or avoid environmental and 
social impacts and risks associated with projects they finance. The Principles are based on the 
International Finance Corporation’s (IFC’s) environmental and social safeguard policies. By 
December 2005, the number of signatories to the Principles had grown from the original 10 
leading banks to 36.3 Together, the Equator Banks are responsible for arranging well over 75 
per cent of worldwide project loans by volume.4  
 
While adoption of the Equator Principles has been a welcome development, it marks only the 
beginning of the path to sustainable finance. The Principles suffer from a number of serious 
flaws that limit their effectiveness both as an integrated policy response to environment and 
social concerns and as an effective tool for the banks to manage their risks.5 First, the Principles 
have significant substantive weaknesses, failing to address many critical substantive issues such 
as human rights and climate change. Even where they do address a critical issue, they are too 
often vague and aspirational and do not reflect applicable international norms or best practice. 
 
Third, and perhaps most critically, the Principles neither require transparency nor any 
mechanism for monitoring implementation or ensuring compliance. Their actual implementation 
has remained largely opaque to outside observers. It is not evident how the Principles have 
influenced financing decisions, shaped the overall portfolios of signatories, or how they have 
been interpreted and applied in any given project.  What is clear is that their adoption has not 
prevented Equator Banks from financing some of the most environmentally and socially risky 
projects that have sought support from international project finance markets in recent years. For 
example, just weeks after signing on to the Principles, nine Equator Banks supported the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. More recently, several Equator Banks have expressed interest in 
joining the consortium financing the Sakhalin II oil project in the Russian Far East, arguing that 
the project is compatible with the Principles.6  
 
As a result, many observers, including BankTrack and some leading private sector analysts, 
have concluded that the Equator Principles are an insufficient response to the challenge of 
sustainable finance.7 Some banks have adopted more stringent policies in certain substantive 
areas, and have begun to apply them beyond the narrow parameters of project finance. 
Moreover, the IFC has drafted a new set of environmental and social “Performance Standards” 
that will replace the present safeguard policies in early 2006. Although some aspects of a few 
commercial banks’ policies (and of the proposed IFC Performance Standards) are improvements 
over the existing Equator Principles, most lag behind applicable international standards and 
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industry best practice principles and do not adequately address weaknesses in the transparency 
and effectiveness of implementation.8   
 
Thus, despite the adoption of the Equator Principles, there is still a pressing need for bank 
policies that are consistent with international standards and best practice and that are applied 
transparently and effectively. Only in that way can the banking sector make the long and urgent 
journey towards sustainability. 
 
PURPOSE OF REPORT 
The primary objective of this report is to review the environmental and social policies adopted 
by key institutions in the commercial banking sector (as of September 2005). It provides a 
detailed analysis of how these policies compare with each other, and, perhaps more crucially, 
how they measure up to international rights, standards and best practice. The report assesses the 
environmental and social policies of 39 banks, including all the private sector banks that had 
signed the Equator Principles by September 2005, plus eight others. 9  
 
As originally conceived, this report also had a secondary objective – to assess the 
implementation and application of the sustainable development policies adopted by the banking 
sector. However, a comprehensive evaluation of the banks’ implementation was foreclosed by 
the near total lack of information they have placed in the public domain. The banks’ lack of 
transparency regarding implementation not only makes independent evaluation impossible, but 
also leaves them open to legitimate charges of “greenwash” – that they are adopting 
environmental rhetoric with little commitment to changing their performance. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
The 39 banks were included in this review on the basis of their high visibility and global reach, 
their acceptance of the Equator Principles, and/or their important presence in global project 
finance markets.10 Banks most active in project finance were chosen because project finance is 
often the most obvious and well-known financial link to damage caused to people and the 
environment. But many other bank operations also have profound, if sometimes hidden, impacts 
on sustainability, and the review considers whether banks apply the same standards across their 
wider portfolios of activity. 
 
We reviewed all the environmental and social policies and annual sustainability reports made 
publicly available by the banks. In addition, we invited all 39 banks to participate in this survey. 
First, we asked them to provide basic information about their policies. Using their responses and 
information in the public domain, we produced draft summaries of their policies. We then asked 
the banks to comment on these drafts and to answer questions designed to resolve any lingering 
ambiguities or information gaps. In both rounds of questions, banks were given a minimum of 
three weeks to respond. Our summaries of the banks’ policies can be found on the BankTrack 
website.11 
 
Only 15 banks responded to the first set of interrogatories, and 23 to the second. Some banks, 
including CIBC and Scotia Bank, responded by refusing to provide information beyond that 
already in the public domain. Others, such as Barclays, Credit Suisse, Mizuho, Royal Bank of  
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Canada and Standard Chartered, explained that they would not share information publicly about 
their environmental and social policies. At a minimum, these banks’ refusal to provide basic 
information about their approach to environmental and social issues reflects a failure to 
Box 3: Banks reviewed in this report 
 
ABN AMRO Bank (Netherlands) 
Banco Bradesco (Brazil)  
Banco de Brasil (Brazil) 
Banco Itaú (Brazil) 
Barclays (UK) 
BBVA (Spain) 
BNDES (Brazil) 
BNP Paribas (France)  
Bank of America (US) 
Calyon (France) 
CIBC (Canada)  
Citigroup (US)  
Credit Suisse Group (Switzerland)  
Deutsche Bank (Germany) 
Dexia (France/Belgium)  
Dresdner Bank (Germany) 
HBOS (UK) 
HSBC Group (UK)  
HVB Group (Germany)  
ING Group (Netherlands) 
JPMorganChase (US)  
KBC (Belgium)  
Korean Development Bank (Korea) 
Manulife (Canada) 
MCC (Italy) 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Japan)  
Mizuho Financial Group (Japan)  
Rabobank Group (Netherlands) 
Royal Bank of Canada (Canada)  
Royal Bank of Scotland (UK) 
Scotia Bank (Canada)  
Standard Chartered Bank (UK)  
Société Général (France)  
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (Japan) 
UBS (Switzerland)  
Unibanco (Brazil)  
Wells Fargo (US) 
West LB 
Westpac 
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appreciate the importance of transparency regarding issues of public concern. More 
fundamentally, it also raises concerns about the commitment of these institutions to address 
sustainable development in any meaningful, consistent or publicly acceptable way. 
 
Based on the information made available, we assessed all the banks’ policies in 14 substantive 
areas of particular environmental or social concern: 
 
• human rights 
• labour rights  
• indigenous people 
• climate and energy 
• dams 
• biodiversity 
• forests 
• fisheries  
• extractive industries 
• sustainable agriculture 
• chemicals 
• transparency and reporting by the clients 
• environmental and social management systems 
 
The banks’ policies and procedures in each of these areas were evaluated against independent 
benchmarks borrowed from two categories of sources. First, we considered the rights, standards 
and norms embedded in widely accepted international conventions, treaties, codes, action plans 
and other hard and soft law instruments. Next, we considered sectoral “best practice” standards, 
particularly those developed through participatory multi-stakeholder processes that included 
government and industry representatives, and that are therefore widely viewed as authoritative 
and legitimate. 
 
As a strictly legal matter, many of the standards derived from international conventions or other 
instruments may be non-binding or bind only governments, not private sector parties. 
Nevertheless, the fact that these standards have been adopted in or endorsed by such 
international instruments, or developed through such broad participatory processes, means they 
reflect a consensus of governments or other leading policy-makers on the importance of the 
issue, the need for international action, and the appropriate policy response. These goals, 
standards and norms thus provide authoritative guidance for all institutions, including non-state 
actors such as banks, for achieving environmental and social sustainability. 
 
Each section includes both a narrative description and a numerical rating of the banks’ policies, 
practices and performance. This is intended to provide a snapshot view for measuring and 
comparing the banks’ policies in each sector. It also allows for evaluating changes and trends 
over time, as the commercial sector responds to the challenges of environmental and social 
sustainability. In general, the numerical scoring reflects the following system (any adjustments 
necessary to reflect the various policy contexts are reflected in each section of the report): 
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 Scoring System for Evaluating Bank Policies 
0 No publicly available policy addressing the subject. 
1 Vaguely worded or “aspirational” policy with no clear commitments. 
2 Some clear commitments, but no part of the policy meets relevant international 
 standards. 
3 Some parts of the policy meet international standards, but other parts are either absent, 
vague or below relevant international standards. 
4 All, or nearly all, of the policy meets or is in line with relevant international  standards. 
 
We also attempted to evaluate the systems and processes each bank has adopted to manage 
environmental and social risk, ensure implementation of the policies (both by their clients and 
their own staff) and provide the public and affected communities with relevant information and 
opportunities to monitor bank performance. Unfortunately, the banks do not make sufficient 
information available to be able to assess adequately issues of implementation. As an alternative 
to an in-depth analysis of implementation, we provide a narrative description of implementation 
benchmarks for the banks. 
 
II. EVALUATING BANK POLICIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
This part of the report evaluates the publicly available policies of the commercial banks against 
existing international norms, standards or best practices in each of 12 categories. As much as 
possible, we have selected norms, standards and best practices that have emerged from 
international conventions, multi-stakeholder processes or, in some cases, industry standards (all 
of which are collectively referred to as “internationally adopted standards”). In some areas, 
NGOs have called for more protective approaches; although our scoring criteria are based on 
international standards adopted or endorsed through international processes beyond the NGO 
sector, we nonetheless encourage the commercial banks to meet NGO-promulgated standards as 
well in developing and implementing future policies, particularly in those areas where no other 
internationally adopted standards yet exist. 
 
1. HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Why a human rights policy is important 
Since the ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945, it has been 
generally agreed that states have the primary responsibility to respect, promote and secure 
human rights. However, state responsibility is neither exclusive nor sufficient. As the Universal 
Declaration makes clear, “every organ of society” has its own human rights obligations. This 
includes business enterprises, and as the reach and impact of such enterprises have grown, so 
too have their human rights obligations. 
 
International human rights include civil, political, cultural, economic and social rights, and the 
right to development.12 Business enterprises have the potential to impact upon these rights – 
both positively and negatively – in a multiplicity of ways. For example, the manner by which a 
company hires and fires its workers, structures and manages its production processes, purchases 
supplies and services, conducts itself in its host community, provides essential public services 
and interacts with governments and regulatory authorities can all profoundly affect the 
promotion or realisation of human rights.13 Changing standards regarding “complicity” and 
“spheres of influence” are also increasingly exposing the private sector to legal liability 
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regarding human rights violations. For these reasons, financial institutions need to adopt 
policies to minimise the potential of any operations they support – directly or indirectly – from 
causing violations of human rights. This requires banks systematically to consider risks to 
human rights in the operations they support, and to take effective action to mitigate those risks.14 
 
B. Best international standards  
The most comprehensive and authoritative treatment of the human rights obligations of 
businesses is the Draft United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (the Norms).15  
These apply existing international human rights principles to business operations. They also 
clarify the fact that transnational corporations and other business enterprises are obliged to 
promote, protect, respect and secure the fulfilment of human rights “within their respective 
spheres of activity and influence”. 
 
The Norms address standards in a number of substantive areas, including: 
 
• the right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination;  
• the right to security of the individual; 
• the rights of workers;  
• respect for national laws and sovereignty;  
• economic, social and cultural rights; 
• corruption; 
• consumer protection; 
• legal protections against forced evictions; 
• environmental protection; and 
• indigenous people. 
 
In 2003, the Norms were unanimously adopted by the UN Sub-commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, and have been presented to the full Commission for 
consideration. 
  
C. Application to the banking sector 
The Norms and their commentaries prescribe a number of specific steps that companies must 
take to be in compliance. They provide that each transnational corporation or other business 
entity should adopt, publicly disseminate and implement internal rules of operation in 
compliance with the Norms. In addition, they should periodically report on and take necessary 
measures to implement the Norms; provide for independent investigation of complaints they 
receive; and apply and incorporate these Norms to their supply chains or other business 
relationships through their contracts, transactions or other arrangements to ensure that they only 
support businesses that follow these or substantially similar principles.16  
 
Perhaps most important for financial institutions, before a business enterprise pursues a major 
initiative or transaction, it must study the human rights impact of that transaction in light of the 
Norms. A sponsor should therefore produce a human rights impact statement that includes a 
description of the transaction, its need, anticipated benefits, an analysis of any anticipated 
human rights impacts, an analysis of reasonable alternatives, and identification of ways to avoid 
any negative human rights consequences. The Norms further declare that the results of this 
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assessment should be made available to relevant stakeholders and that the sponsor should 
consider any reactions from stakeholders.17 
 
D. Assessment of the banking sector 
Because the IFC has declined to address human rights in its environmental and social policies, 
the banks that have agreed only to follow the Equator Principles have not taken on adequate 
human rights commitments. By the end of 2005, only eight banks had publicly adopted a human 
rights policy: ABN AMRO, Barclays, HBOS, ING, Rabobank, Société Général, Standard 
Chartered and Westpac. 
 
The human rights policies of these eight banks vary widely in their scope and rigour. Only 
Rabobank has committed to follow the UN Norms and explicitly endorsed the Universal 
Declaration. ABN AMRO and Westpac do not reference the UN Norms, but do reference many 
of the most important conventions that are incorporated into the Norms. 
 
Barclays has perhaps the most curious relationship with the Norms. Barclays is one of seven 
original members of the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, which is intended in part 
to “road test” the Norms. But its policies do not specifically reference them. Instead, Barclays’ 
current human rights policy is unhelpfully vague and aspirational, and provides little guidance 
for putting into operation a commitment to human rights. 
 
Unfortunately, such shortcomings are not unique to Barclays. Indeed, a consistent problem with 
the human rights policies of many of the banks we reviewed is that they often fall short of a firm 
commitment to adhere to the standards they reference, and lack clear processes for applying the 
human rights commitments to their operations. For example, ABN AMRO is “guided by” a list 
of human rights standards, and ING “supports” the Universal Declaration and “endeavours” to 
apply it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Only a handful of banks have recognised the importance of international human rights in their 
lending operations. By committing to adhere to the UN Norms, Rabobank has gone the furthest. 
However, none of the banks has adopted a human rights policy that clearly describes how it 
translates its commitment to its lending operations. 
 
Ratings: According to our review of the policies, Rabobank’s human rights policy incorporates 
the leading international standards as reflected in the UN Norms and therefore receives the 
highest possible score of (4) for its human rights policy. 
 
ABN AMRO and Westpac have adopted significant parts of the international human rights 
regime, but have not yet endorsed all of those reflected in the UN Norms. They thus receive a 
rating of (3). The largely aspirational policies of Barclays, HBOS, ING, Société Général and 
Standard Chartered each receive a rating of (1). 
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Ratings 
 
4: Rabobank  
3: ABN AMRO and Westpac 
1: Barclays, HBOS, ING, Société Général and Standard Chartered 
0: All other banks 
 
Even in the case of Rabobank’s top-flight policy, the key question remains one of 
implementation. With such little information now available, it is impossible to determine 
whether Rabobank or any bank has developed an integrated system for implementing its human 
rights policy or for managing the risks that arise from transactions with potential human rights 
impacts. Nor has any bank yet demonstrated positive impacts on its portfolios or operations.  
 
 
Summary Chart of Human Rights Standards 
Standard 
 
Origin  Examples of relevant 
adoptions 
Commit to the UN Norms UN Norms Rabobank 
Endorse the UN Declaration UN Human Rights 
Declaration 
Rabobank, Westpac, ABN 
AMRO, ING 
Commit to the norms in the 
UNCCPR 
UNCCPR Westpac, ABN AMRO, 
Rabobank (through the 
Norms)  
Commit to the norms in the 
UNCESCR 
UNCESCR Westpac, ABN AMRO, 
Rabobank (through the 
Norms) 
Require Human Rights 
Impact Assessments 
UN Norms  
Commit to respecting or 
promoting human rights 
 ABN AMRO, Barclays, 
HBOS, ING, Rabobank, 
Société Général, Standard 
Chartered, Westpac, EBRD,18 
Export Credits Guarantee 
Department (UK) 
 
 
2. LABOUR  
A. Why a labour policy is important 
Protecting people in the workplace is a fundamental responsibility of companies and 
governments. Workers have the right to be free of discrimination and abuse, to work in a safe 
environment, to associate freely with co-workers and representative organisations, and to earn 
fair wages and benefits. These basic conditions help to develop in-country human resources and 
thereby contribute to sustainable development more generally. These rights can also contribute 
to the development and growth of democratic societies, and thereby help create a more 
favourable operating climate for business. 
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A stable and satisfied labour force can have a significant impact on the economic success of the 
employer. According to the 1995 World Development Report, Workers in an Integrating World, 
union activities to promote non-discrimination and establish basic labour standards can lead to 
higher efficiency and productivity.19 For example, ensuring health and safety protections, 
establishing communication channels between employer and employee, and maintaining robust 
grievance and arbitration processes, can all contribute to enhanced productivity and more 
stability in the workforce. Without clear standards and protection for workers, the relationship 
between employer and employee can become antagonistic and unproductive, leading to 
increased risk and decreased stability. 
 
B. Best international standards 
 
The framework for a sound labour policy is provided by the International Labour Organisation’s 
(ILO’s) Core Labour Rights and the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises & Social Policy, both of which are also reflected in the UN Norms. 
  
The ILO’s four fundamental or “core” labour rights are: 
 
• Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining;20 
• a ban on forced labour;21 
• a ban on exploitative child labour;22 and 
• a ban on discrimination in the workplace and in professions.23 
 
The Tripartite Declaration, a result of consensus between governments, employees and 
corporations, addresses the responsibilities of corporations and their treatment of labour more 
specifically. In addition to re-affirming workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, and a ban on discrimination and forced labour, the agreement calls on corporations 
to:  
 
• increase employment opportunities and standards, and give priority to the employment 
and advancement of nationals of the host country and to the use of local materials, 
manufacturing and processing;24 
 
• promote equal opportunity and treatment by making qualifications, skill and experience 
the basis for the recruitment, placement, training and advancement of staff at all 
levels;25 
 
• promote employment security and avoid arbitrary dismissals. If an employment change 
is necessary, to provide reasonable notice of such changes to the appropriate 
government authorities and worker representatives;26 
 
• ensure that relevant training is provided for all levels of their employees and  
management;27 
 
• provide the best possible wages, benefits and conditions for employees, which should 
not be less favourable than those offered by comparable local employers. These should 
be related to the economic position of the company and meet the basic needs of the 
workers and their families;28 
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• maintain the highest standards of safety and health, and make available information on 
hazards to government authorities and workers’ and employers’ organisations;29  
 
• establish a process for regular consultation between workers and employer;30 and  
 
• establish a process to address grievances.31 
 
C. Application to the banking sector  
A best practice labour policy for financial institutions should comprise several elements. First, it 
should be based on law and standards. This means that the policy should be based on local, 
national or international law, whichever provides greater workers’ rights protection. The policy 
should also clarify the bank’s adherence to the four ILO core labour standards and the Tripartite 
Declaration in its own employment practices and screen all applicants for financial support 
according to whether they comply with these standards. 
 
Second, the policy should establish specific requirements for clients, including requiring that 
the borrower pays fair wages and benefits, offers adequate training and protection of health and 
safety, and provides adequate advance notice in the case of employment changes. 
 
Third, the policy should ensure that borrowers or other clients have established clear 
procedures for ongoing communication and consultation with their employees, fair grievance 
mechanisms, and transparent monitoring and supervision processes. 
 
Fourth, the policy should include the bank’s programme for monitoring and supervising the 
client’s implementation and compliance with the policy standards. Such a programme should 
include regular, independent and transparent monitoring; independent audits that might include 
unannounced site visits; processes for learning about employee grievances directly; clear steps 
for remediation; and a mechanism for seeking resolution of violations or disputes. 
 
Fifth, the policy should have clear procedures for ongoing monitoring and supervision of the 
supply chain’s adherence to the policy. The client should include the policy requirements in the 
contractual agreements between itself and its suppliers. The FTSE Group has developed the 
FTSE4Good Supply Chain Labour Standards Criteria which provide a useful basis for such 
standards.32   
 
Finally, each bank should develop a clear strategy for successfully implementing the policy. 
This requires each bank to disseminate a clear, written labour policy that has the full support of 
the bank’s management and board. Moreover, the impact assessment process evaluating 
potential impacts of financial operations should identify potential impacts on the local 
workforce.  
 
D. Assessing bank performance 
By endorsing the Global Compact, many banks have committed to apply the four core labour 
standards/eight labour conventions to their own corporate operations – but none has developed a 
specific labour policy applicable to its lending operations. The banks endorsing the Global 
Compact include ABN AMRO, Banco do Brasil, BBVA, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse First 
Boston, Deutsche Bank, Dexia, Dresdner, HSBC, JPMorganChase, KBC, Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Société Général, UBS and Westpac. Exactly how these banks guarantee that their 
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operations meet these core standards remains a mystery, as no supporting policies are publicly 
available. 
 
As described above, Rabobank has endorsed the UN Norms, which include the labour norms 
contained in the core labour standards. In addition, Westpac acknowledges other international 
agreements by committing to respect and support the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the Tripartite 
Declaration. However, Westpac has not formulated a labour policy that describes how it applies 
these standards to its lending operations. 
 
Dexia, Barclays and Société Général appear to extend labour concerns to their own suppliers of 
goods and services. Dexia’s policy, for example, prohibits all its suppliers and subcontractors 
from relying on child or forced labour, or from engaging in any psychological or physical 
coercion or abuse, and requires them to comply with all legal requirements relating to 
discrimination and to all other labour laws in force. But again, the policies apply only to the 
three banks’ own operations; they have not screened or required their clients to take measures to 
ensure supply chain compliance with any labour standards. 
 
Other banks that have addressed labour issues have fallen short of affirming the four core labour 
standards. Citigroup, for example, only commits to the prohibitions on forced and child labour, 
and Standard Chartered states that while it supports the core labour standards, it is also mindful 
that not all countries have ratified these conventions – implying that the bank will only enforce 
the standards in countries that have ratified them. Banco Itaú commits to a workers’ right to 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. 
 
Citigroup has taken one important step when compared with the others. It is the only bank to 
apply explicit labour commitments to its clients. Citigroup’s policy states that it will not finance 
activities that employ harmful child labour or forced labour.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Only Rabobank and Citigroup have adopted labour standards that apply at least in part to the 
bank’s clients. By adopting the UN Norms, Rabobank has embraced the four core labour 
standards, but has not necessarily addressed the other internationally recognised labour 
standards reflected in the Tripartite Declaration. It thus receives a base score of (3). Citigroup’s 
policy lags behind Rabobank’s because it reflects only two of the four international standards, 
but according to our criteria still receives a rating of (3). 
 
The banks that have signed the Global Compact (and thus explicitly endorse the four core 
labour standards for their own operations) have taken a limited first step towards promoting 
international labour standards. But the Global Compact does not require banks to apply the core 
labour standards to their clients, and lacks meaningful compliance mechanisms. As a result, 
these banks are given a rating of (1). This reflects the fact that they have a policy that addresses 
labour issues – but that the policy is seriously flawed. 
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Ratings 
 
3: Rabobank, Citigroup 
1: ABN AMRO, Banco do Brasil, BBVA, BNP      
 Paribas, Credit Suisse First Boston,      
 Deutsche Bank, Dexia, Dresdner, HSBC,      
 JPMorganChase, KBC, Royal Bank of Scotland,     
 Société Général, UBS and Westpac 
0: All other banks 
 
With the limited information currently available, it is impossible to determine whether any of 
the banks have developed an integrated system for implementing their labour policy or for 
managing the risks that arise from transactions with potential labour issues. Nor has any bank 
yet demonstrated how its labour policies have positively impacted upon its portfolios or 
operations. 
 
Summary Chart of Labour Standards 
Standard 
 
Origin  Example of Relevant 
Adoptions  
Four core labour standards: 
freedom of association; ban 
on child and forced labour 
and ban on discrimination 
ILO Core Labour 
Conventions,  
OECD Guidelines33 
 
Rabobank, Citigroup, 15 other 
banks that have adopted the 
standards for their own 
operations through the Global 
Compact, US Overseas 
Private Investment 
Corporation,34  
UK’s Export Credit 
Guarantee Department35 
 
Prioritise and generate local 
employment 
Tripartite Declaration, OECD 
Guidelines36 
 
Avoid arbitrary dismissals 
and allow adequate time for 
notice of employment 
changes 
Tripartite Declaration, OECD 
Guidelines37 
 
Training of employees Tripartite Declaration, OECD 
Guidelines38 
 
Provide best possible wages, 
benefits and conditions that 
meet local needs and are no 
less favourable than those 
provided by comparable local 
employers 
Tripartite Declaration, OECD 
Guidelines39 
 
Establish a process for regular 
consultations and grievance 
mechanisms 
Tripartite Declaration, OECD 
Guidelines40 
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3. INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
A. Why an indigenous people policy is important 
Throughout the world, indigenous people have long been subjugated and disenfranchised. 
Today, they are still disproportionately vulnerable to human rights abuses, loss of culture, loss 
of land and access to territories, and even the threat of extinction. Because of their relationship 
with ancestral lands and territories, indigenous people also have strong claims under 
international law to sovereignty and self-determination. An extensive body of international law, 
instruments and norms recognise indigenous people as having a unique set of rights and 
protections, and provide guidance and direction to protect their societies, cultures and 
livelihoods. Moreover, companies and investors face major moral and risk issues when their 
investments adversely impact upon indigenous people. One aspect of managing this risk 
includes understanding and respecting the legal rights of indigenous people and establishing a 
meaningful dialogue process that respects these rights.41 
 
B. Best international standards 
International law recognises that indigenous people have inherent rights derived from their 
distinct identities and their close and special attachment to their ancestral lands. These rights 
establish the basis for the following standards or norms: 
 
Right to self-identification 
The right of indigenous people to self-identify as indigenous is crucial. The UN Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People recognises that they “have the collective and 
individual right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including 
the right to identify themselves as indigenous and to be recognised as such”.42 
 
Right to self-determination 
The right to self-determination for indigenous people is set out in the 1966 International Human 
Rights Covenants, which recognise all people’s right to freely determine their political status, 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development and dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources. 43 
 
Right to Free, prior informed consent 
The right of indigenous people to free, prior informed consent (FPIC) has been recognised in 
international law and in the emerging consensus of states and companies. For example, the 
principle has been endorsed by ILO Convention 169, which states that “consultations [with 
indigenous people should be] carried out…in good faith and in a form appropriate to the 
circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent”.44 Further, the Convention 
declares that indigenous people “have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of 
development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual wellbeing and the lands 
they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own 
economic, social and cultural development”.45 It also requires the informed consent of 
indigenous people before any relocation. 
 
FPIC has also been confirmed by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,46 the UN Human Rights Norms for Business,47 the World Commission on Dams,48 the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),49 the UN Development Programme50 and the UN 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.51  
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Box 4:  Free, prior informed consent versus consultations 
 
Free, prior informed consent (FPIC) can be viewed as a natural evolution from current corporate 
practice – community consultation – that helps ensure more investment certainty and reduce 
corporate risks. 
 
In preparing environmental and social impact assessments, companies are accustomed to 
holding a “consultation” with local communities and/or a notice and comment period to receive 
public input. The key difference is that consultations do not require companies to respond and 
address the input or concerns raised by local communities. Consultations are designed as more 
of a one-way street: input comes in but there are no guarantees that local concerns will be 
addressed. This process often leads to discontent and frustration on the part of community 
stakeholders if they believe their concerns have gone unaddressed. 
 
FPIC differs because its goal is a determination of support, or not, for a particular investment. 
Unlike a consultation process, FPIC is a two-way, interactive negotiation that offers 
communities greater influence in decision-making, and is more likely to result in direct benefits 
for them. The process requires full and early disclosure of information and potential impacts of 
a proposed investment. It enables all parties to put forward their concerns, and should therefore 
lead to solutions or proposals for addressing community concerns and averting problems later 
for businesses. The process is also about fair compensation for impacts and risks and (of 
particular importance) improved benefits for a community.  
 
Contrary to some criticisms, FPIC is not a process that allows individuals to speak for a 
community and stop projects and/or transactions from going forward, but is based on 
community processes and representations of groups of people. FPIC should be followed for any 
investment that poses risks or threats to a community. 
 
Protection of land and territorial rights 
The distinct cultural identity and existence of indigenous people hinge on protection of their 
ancestral lands and their unique relationship to that land. This is reflected in the UN Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People52 and ILO Convention 169.53  
 
The UN Draft Declaration affords indigenous people the right to own, control and use their land 
and territories (Article 26), including “the right to the full recognition of their laws, tradition, 
customs, land tenure systems and institutions for the development and management of 
resources...”54 It also recognises full ownership and control of indigenous people’s cultural and 
intellectual property as well as restitution of land, resources, cultural and intellectual property 
where these have been taken or damaged without their consent.55 
 
Similarly, ILO Convention 169 establishes clear rights and protection for indigenous people to 
their lands and territories, including calling for the recognition of the “rights of ownership and 
possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy… In 
addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples 
concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally 
had access for their subsistence and traditional activities”.56 
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Participation and non-discrimination 
The rights of indigenous people to fully participate in all decisions that affect their lives is 
recognised in a number of norms and legal instruments. For example, the Vienna Conference on 
Human Rights calls on states to ensure the full and free participation of indigenous people in all 
aspects of society, in particular in matters of concern to them.57 The UN Draft Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous People also establishes the right to full participation58 and the 
importance of fair procedures for resolving conflicts and disputes.59   
 
Compensation and benefit-sharing 
Indigenous people have the right to just and fair compensation for the use of their land, 
knowledge and resources, as confirmed by the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People. A report by the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) 
initiative also calls for benefit-sharing arrangements that go beyond fair compensation for 
damages to ensure that indigenous people actually benefit.60 Furthermore, the Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD) addresses the fair and equitable use of biodiversity resources, including 
genetic material, and requires that the traditional knowledge of indigenous and local 
communities may only be used with their “approval”. This has subsequently been interpreted to 
mean their prior informed consent.61  
 
Involuntary resettlement 
The right to consent to resettlement is another fundamental concern of indigenous people. This 
is addressed in the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, which states that 
indigenous people “shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation 
shall take place without the free and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and 
after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return”.62 
 
No-Go zones for uncontacted people 
The livelihoods and culture of uncontacted people, or people living in voluntary isolation, must 
be protected from potential investment. The IDB recognises this in its indigenous people policy 
by agreeing not to support any project that poses adverse impacts on uncontacted people.63 
 
C. Application to the banking sector  
Banks should develop a separate policy that addresses the impacts on, and respects the rights of, 
indigenous people. These policies should be based on international laws and instruments, 
including the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, and address the 
following issues: 
 
• the right to self-identification; 
• the right to self-determination; 
• the right to free, prior and informed consent; 
• recognition and protection of territorial rights; 
• the right to participation and non-discrimination; 
• the right to compensation and benefit sharing; 
• a prohibition of involuntary resettlement; and 
• protection of uncontacted people and people living in voluntary isolation. 
 
These policies should be developed collaboratively with representatives of indigenous people’s 
organisations. 
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D. Assessing bank performance  
Banks that have signed on to the Equator Principles have agreed to take additional precautions 
for projects that affect indigenous people. The Principles require that project sponsors assess 
impacts on indigenous people. Where projects will have significant impacts, signatory banks 
must ensure “that the borrower or third party expert has consulted, in a structured and culturally 
appropriate way, with project affected groups, including indigenous peoples…” These banks 
also require borrowers to follow the IFC’s safeguard policy on indigenous people, which 
requires consultation and the establishment of an indigenous people’s development plan. The 
IFC policies do not, however, require borrowers to obtain the free, prior informed consent of 
indigenous communities, nor does it adequately recognise the ancestral rights of indigenous 
people. 
 
Only five banks currently have policies that explicitly address the rights and protection of 
indigenous people: ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Citigroup, HSBC and JPMorganChase. 
JPMorganChase has the strongest and most comprehensive policy. It commits the bank to 
finance projects only where: 
 
• free, prior informed consultation results in support of the project by the affected 
indigenous people; 
• indigenous people have been able to engage in informed participation and collective 
decision-making;  
• where information has been provided in a culturally appropriate manner at each stage of 
the project preparation, implementation and operation;  
• indigenous communities have been given adequate time to study that information; 
• access to a grievance mechanism has been provided;  
• where consultation approaches that rely on existing customary institutions have been 
used; and  
• major indigenous land claims been appropriately addressed.  
 
While JPMorganChase’s policy fails to incorporate the right of indigenous people to give their 
free, prior informed consent, it does require that “free, prior informed consultation” leads to 
community support before it will finance a project. 
 
HSBC also adopts this consultation terminology. In implementing the Equator Principles, 
HSBC has stated that it will only proceed with Category A and higher-risk Category B projects 
where free, prior and informed consultation has taken place with affected groups (not strictly 
indigenous people). In addition, HSBC addresses indigenous rights to land, territory and 
resources through its forest policy, which adopts the principles of the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC), and its Freshwater Infrastructure Policy, which adopts the recommendations of 
the World Commission on Dams. 
 
The other three banks – ABN AMRO, Bank of America and Citigroup – have chosen to address 
the rights of indigenous people in a very limited way through their forestry policies. ABN 
AMRO recognises customary and legal land rights of indigenous people, while Bank of 
America and Citigroup have nearly identical policies focused on ensuring culturally appropriate 
consultation and adequate representation for indigenous people. Bank of America makes an 
additional commitment not to finance any projects where indigenous people’s land claims are 
unsettled. However, because these provisions are set out in their forest policies, their application 
beyond forest-related projects is unclear. 
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CONCLUSION 
Neither the Equator Principles nor any of the specific indigenous peoples policies adopted by 
the banks fully meet the international standards and best practices with respect to indigenous 
people. The strongest policy appears to be that of JPMorganChase, which has committed to 
screening and supporting only those projects that are supported by indigenous people after free, 
prior informed consultation. Under our rating system, JPMorganChase’s policy receives a (3) 
for incorporating some, but not all, important elements of international standards or best 
practices. 
 
JPMorganChase’s policy is significantly more detailed and operationally focused than those of 
ABN AMRO, Citigroup, Bank of America or HSBC. Moreover, the limitation to forest projects 
implied in HSBC’s policy, and the policies of other banks, significantly limit their scope. 
Forestry projects are not the only transactions that impact upon the livelihood, culture and 
wellbeing of indigenous communities – mines, dams, pipelines, soy plantations or even tourism 
activities can have equally harmful impacts. Thus the rights of indigenous people and the 
associated norms identified above must be adopted in a comprehensive indigenous people 
policy for all banks. These banks each receive a (1) for their policies which are limited in scope 
and fall short of international norms; in fact, they provide little additional protection to that 
afforded by the Equator Principles. Because the IFC policies underlying the Equator Principles 
include an indigenous people policy, albeit one that falls short of international standards, the 
Equator Principle banks each receive a (1) as well. 
 
Ratings 
 
3: JPMorganChase 
1: ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Citigroup, HSBC, other Equator Principle banks 
0: All other banks 
 
Summary Chart of Indigenous People Standards 
Standard Origin Example of Adoption 
Free, prior informed consent UN Human Rights Norms for 
Business; ILO Convention 169, World 
Commission on Dams, UN Draft 
Declaration on Indigenous Rights 
 
Inter-American Development 
Bank, United Nations 
Development Programme, 
Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation, Rio Tinto,64 
Anglo American,65 
International Business Leaders’ 
Forum, Calvert Group 
Right to self-determination International Covenant on Human 
Rights 
Calvert Group 
Protection of land and 
territorial rights 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People 
ILO Convention 169 
Danish Agency for 
International Development,66 
JPMorganChase, HSBC, ABN-
AMRO, Calvert Group 
 
Right to self-identification Draft Declaration on the Rights of  
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Indigenous People 
Resettlement Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People 
ILO Convention 169 
German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ)67 
 
Participation and non-
discrimination 
 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People 
 
Dutch Foreign Ministry and 
Directorate General for 
Development Cooperation,68 
JPMorganChase 
 
Compensation and benefit 
sharing 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
No-Go zones for uncontacted 
people 
 Inter-American Development 
Bank  
 
 
4. CLIMATE AND ENERGY 
A. Why a climate change policy is important 
The climate is changing, and will continue to change, as a direct result of human activities that 
increase the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), failure to reduce greenhouse gas 
concentrations will result in a global temperature increase of nearly 6°C by the end of this 
century. Such global warming is likely to lead to substantial changes in glacial and polar ice, sea 
levels, the intensity of storms and the incidence and severity of droughts, and may even alter the 
basic patterns of ocean currents. These extraordinary and unprecedented risks to the global 
environment are likely to have profound and potentially disastrous economic, social and health 
impacts. The most direct way to alleviate and lessen the impacts of climate change is to reduce 
significantly greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. 
  
Climate change has introduced new risks and opportunities for industry that will drive decisions 
on how to innovate and operate globally.69 For investors, climate change presents new financial 
issues. Unlike other environmental risks, which are generally concentrated in certain sectors, 
climate risk cuts across sectors and even whole economies. The French insurance company 
AXA has estimated that about 20 per cent of global GDP is now affected by climatic events and 
that “climatic risk in numerous branches of industry is more important than the risk of interest 
rates or foreign exchange risk”.70 Yet climate change also introduces new opportunities for 
industry: the renewable energy market could be worth an estimated US$1.9 trillion by 2020,71  
and the global carbon market up to US$250 billion.72   
 
B. Best international standards 
Because the climate change problem is global in nature, it requires an internationally 
coordinated set of responses. The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol are the two most important international treaties 
addressing the threat of global climate change. The UNFCCC establishes overall global 
objectives and principles, and requires all member countries to report annually on their net 
greenhouse gas emissions. The UNFCCC has near-universal membership among the world’s 
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countries, including the United States. The Kyoto Protocol builds on the principles and 
objectives of the UNFCCC and establishes targets and timetables for industrialised countries to 
limit or reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases to an average of 5.2 per cent below 1990 
levels. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, with the participation of all industrialised 
countries except the United States and Australia. Developing countries, almost all of which have 
joined the UNFCC and Kyoto Protocol, are not obliged to set specific targets and timetables for 
addressing greenhouse gas concentrations and are not likely to do so until at least the next 
reporting period, which begins in 2012. 
 
As a result of these international agreements, policies to regulate greenhouse gas emissions are 
being developed and implemented in major markets around the world. Companies in carbon-
intensive sectors will be subject to regulations and standards in the EU, Australia, Canada, 
Japan, Russia, and some US regional markets.73 In addition, these countries, as well as 
developing nations such as China, are introducing new regulations on fuel economy and CO2 
emissions in the automotive sector. Market-based emissions trading programmes, including the 
European Union Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the UK 
Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS), and the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), are also 
emerging in a number of countries. 
 
Three main elements of a corporate climate policy are now clear: assessing and reporting on 
climate emissions and impacts; reducing greenhouse gas emissions at the transaction and 
portfolio level; and shifting towards green technologies in carbon-intensive sectors, particularly 
energy and transport. 
 
Assessing and reporting on climate emissions  
The increasingly accepted standard for accounting, measuring and reporting on greenhouse gas 
emissions is the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) developed jointly by the World 
Resources Institute and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.74 A growing 
list of companies has adopted the GHG Protocol for tracking and reporting their emissions, 
including BP, Cargill, IBM, Norsk Hydro and Volkswagen. In the banking sector, Bank of 
America and Royal Bank of Scotland have adopted the GHG Protocol.75 The GHG Protocol is 
consistent with the guidelines issued by the IPCC for reporting on emissions at a national level. 
 
Reducing climate emissions 
Of course, reporting on emissions does little to reduce the risks of climate change – actual 
decreases in emissions are required. Establishing emissions reduction targets is fast 
becoming standard practice for businesses today.76 In fact, many companies have set more 
aggressive targets than those established by the Kyoto Protocol (on average 5.2 per cent 
from 1990 levels). See Box 5. 
Box 5:  Examples of corporate reduction targets 
ABB: Reduce GHG emissions by 1 per cent each year from 1998 to 2005. 
Alcoa: Reduce GHG emissions by 25 per cent from 1990 levels by 2010, and by 50 per cent 
from 1990 levels when its inert anode technology is fully commercialised.  
Baxter International: Reduce energy use and associated GHG emissions by 30 per cent per 
unit of product value from 1996 levels by 2005. 
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British Petroleum: Reduce GHG emissions by 10 per cent from 1990 levels by 2010 (this has 
been achieved already) and hold net GHGs stable at 1990 levels to 2012. 
DuPont: Reduce GHG emissions by 65 per cent from 1990 levels by 2010 (achieved 67 per 
cent reduction by 2002); hold total energy use to 1990 levels until 2010 and source 10 per cent 
of global energy use from renewable resources by 2010. 
Polaroid:  Reduce CO2 emissions 20 per cent below 1994 levels by the end of 2005 and 25 per 
cent by 2010. 
Rio Tinto: Reduce on-site GHG emissions per unit of production by 4.8 per cent from 
1990 levels by 2001 (achieved already). 
Royal Dutch/Shell: Reduce GHG emissions by 10 per cent from 1990 levels by 2002. 
 
Shifting towards climate-friendly technology 
To respond successfully to climate change, society needs to transform the most carbon-intensive 
sectors – energy and transport. The United Nations, for example, has identified renewable 
energy and improved energy efficiency as an important component of the Millennium 
Development Goals.77 In some countries and regions, investment opportunities in renewable 
energy and energy efficiencies are rapidly increasing. The EU, for instance, has committed to 
double its share of renewable energy to 12 per cent of the gross energy consumption by 2010. 
Developing countries such as Brazil, China and India have also committed to increasing 
investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency (China has pledged to increase its 
investments to reach 10 per cent of its total energy output by 2010).78 
 
C. Application to the banking sector  
To avoid the most disastrous consequences of global climate change, the financial sector must 
be an innovative driving force towards a more climate-friendly economy. 79 Moreover, climate 
change presents costs and risks for the financial sector that must be considered in its risk 
management. It is thus important for banks to establish a climate or energy policy and strategy 
that addresses the following issues: 
 
Climate risk 
First, banks must incorporate climate risk into their overall client risk identification and 
assessment process, and develop a set of assessment tools to determine carbon reduction 
options. This will be particularly important for financial support of the energy, utilities, 
automotive, transport and extractives sectors.  
 
Assessing and reporting on climate emissions 
Second, banks must require their clients to adopt a greenhouse gas accounting and public 
reporting system such as the GHG Protocol, and to publish annual emissions reports. Through 
the Carbon Disclosure Project, a coalition of institutional investors already asks the world’s 
largest companies to report voluntarily their annual investment-related and emissions 
information relating to climate change.80 More than 70 per cent of Fortune 500 companies, 
including many financial institutions, completed the annual questionnaire. Based on their 
responses, the CDP judged nine banks included in this study to be “Climate Leaders”: ABN 
AMRO, Barclays, Dexia, HBOS, HSBC, HVB, RBC, UBS and Westpac.81 
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The CDP is an important initiative to promote more transparency and disclosure about corporate 
actions, including bank operations, on climate change. However, the responses are voluntary (so 
there is no obligation to report or account for emissions) and the quality of the responses varies 
widely. As a result, the database does not yet provide a reliable overall inventory of emissions. 
Moreover, with one exception, the CDP covers mostly the emissions from the banks’ internal 
operations, and not those from the activities they support. The lone exception asks financial 
services companies whether they consider the “emissions related risks and/or opportunities of 
the companies you invest in, lend to, or insure”. This elicited a range of mostly unhelpful 
responses. For example, ABN AMRO states in its 2005 CDP3 response, “As a financial 
institution, our only relevant indirect emission is business air travel”. The Royal Bank of 
Scotland merely states, “Commercial Banking financial products don’t really lend themselves to 
measurement in these terms”. HSBC more thoughtfully answers, “We are aware that our direct 
impact on climate change is small compared with the size of our business. Our most significant 
impact is the investment and lending decisions we make. Therefore, we are looking at solutions 
to climate change through our investments and funding.” 
  
Reducing climate emissions 
Third, banks must require their clients to meet carbon reduction targets. For financial service 
providers this includes establishing transaction and portfolio level reduction targets that will not 
only reduce the direct emissions from their own operations, but also reduce the climate impacts 
of the transactions and other client activities that they support. At a minimum, the banking 
sector should adopt a policy requiring its clients to meet the Kyoto Protocol average target 
reductions of 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels. 
 
Where emissions reductions are cost prohibitive, the industry can require carbon offsets – 
investing in outside projects that either avoid emissions in the first place or remove existing 
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere (carbon sequestration). In this regard, WWF has 
developed a “Gold Standard” for carbon investments, which is increasingly being accepted as 
the industry standard.82 
 
Catalysing technology shifts 
The fourth crucial element of an effective climate policy is to develop and fund a proactive 
strategy for investing in renewable energy and energy efficiency programmes and projects. In 
2004, the 154 governments attending the International Conference for Renewable Energies 
called on the banking sector to offer more financing for renewable energy, and more risk-
hedging financial tools to reduce investment risks in this sector.83  The Climate Convention also 
emphasises the role of “organisations in a position to do so” to promote, facilitate and finance 
the transfer of environmentally sound technologies.84  
 
Many financial institutions are starting to recognise the opportunities of investing in renewable 
energy and energy efficiency programmes. Through the OECD, the Export Credit Agencies 
(ECAs) recently agreed to provide favourable financing terms to help promote investment in 
renewable energy alternatives.85 Likewise, in 2004 in response to the Extractive Industries 
Review, the World Bank Group committed to a 20 per cent increase in investments in 
renewables and energy efficiency programmes over a five-year period. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) remains the leader among multilateral development 
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banks, having invested 22 per cent of its total energy portfolio between 1999 and 2004 in energy 
efficiency.86 
 
An emphasis on shifting towards clean technologies also means that banks must shift their 
portfolios away from the largest greenhouse gas projects, particularly those aimed at expanding 
fossil fuel use. Banks must take a portfolio-wide effort to reduce the carbon impacts of their 
transactions, which requires a commitment to move away from, or phase out, high-carbon and 
fossil fuel investments. 
 
Taken together, these steps – assessing and addressing climate risk, accounting and reporting on 
climate emissions, setting targets for reductions of greenhouse gas emissions, and actively 
reducing portfolio emissions while investing in clean technologies – comprise an effective 
strategy for addressing climate change. A strong policy should be complemented by proactive 
leadership in carbon funding and climate policy, as well as proactive efforts to educate and 
support the banks’ entire client base in responding to climate change. Because banks are active 
in many parts of the financial sector, including insurance, they can be particularly influential 
voices for educating clients and others about the need to address climate change.   
 
D.  Assessing bank performance  
Nothing in the Equator Principles or the IFC safeguard policies specifically addresses climate 
change, although Equator Banks should clearly be assessing the potential climate impacts of 
carbon-intensive projects as part of the required environmental assessments. Only three banks 
presently have a specific policy on climate change: Bank of America, Citibank and 
JPMorganChase. ABN AMRO and HSBC have indicated their intention to develop a climate 
policy in 2006. 
 
The two banks with the best policies are JPMorganChase and Bank of America. 
JPMorganChase has committed to work with its largest greenhouse gas-emitting clients to 
develop carbon mitigation plans, which include measuring and disclosing greenhouse gas 
emissions and developing strategies to reduce or offset them. In the power sector, 
JPMorganChase will encourage the development of alternative energies by quantifying the 
financial costs of emissions and internalising them into the financial analysis of transactions. 
Starting in 2006, the bank will report annually on greenhouse gas emissions from its power 
portfolio and work with clients to develop new financial products that facilitate emission 
reductions. 
 
Bank of America’s policy is noteworthy because it includes a reduction target that  commits the 
bank to report and reduce emissions from its own operations (and, more significantly, from its 
energy and utility portfolios) by 7 per cent by 2008. 
 
Unlike JPMorganChase and Bank of America, Citigroup’s policy does not include a 
commitment either to emissions reductions or carbon mitigation plans. Citigroup only commits 
to report on emissions resulting from its support of the energy sector. This could be a significant 
step if it included a comprehensive assessment of the emission intensity of all transactions 
undertaken by the bank, and a pricing policy that internalised carbon-related risks into the 
financing terms and conditions. Only with such a quantified basis could the actual costs from 
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emissions be passed on to the emitters either through higher risk premiums or other pricing 
policies. 
 
Dresdner Bank reportedly has a screening process for carbon risks applicable to its project 
finance activities, and is developing a corporate-wide carbon risk strategy that would extend to 
the whole Allianz Group, including insurance, financing and asset management. This may 
provide the greatest leverage for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Several other banks are now implementing programmes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
from their own internal banking operations. These include ABN AMRO, Bank of Tokyo 
Mitsubishi, Barclays, HSBC, HVB and Scotia Bank. See Box 6. HSBC is clearly the leader in 
addressing climate reductions for internal operations, as it has reportedly already achieved its 
pledge to be the first financial service company to become carbon neutral by 2006. 
 
 
Table 2: Carbon Reduction Commitments for Internal Bank Operations 
BANK Carbon footprint 
(internal emissions)  
Emission reduction  Targets 
ABN AMRO 366,293 tons of CO2 
in 2004 
 
Reduced worldwide direct 
CO2 emissions by 4 per cent, 
and indirect emissions by 9 
per cent between 2003 and 
2004. 
 
Reduce absolute 
GHG emissions 
by 50 per cent 
from 1990 to 
2005. 
HBOS 29,240 tons of CO2 in 
2004 
 
13 per cent reduction in 
CO2 emissions per full-time 
equivalent employee 
between 2001 and 2004. 
Providing 89.7 per cent of 
electricity from renewable 
sources. 
 
Reduce CO2 
emissions by 10 
per cent per full-
time equivalent 
employee 
between 2001 
and 2004. Set an 
additional 5 per 
cent reduction 
target 
for 2005-2010. 
 
HSBC 585,000 tons of CO2 
in 2004 
 
Emissions per employee 
decreased by 19 per cent 
between 2002 and 2004. 
 
Carbon neutrality 
by 2006. 
 
HVB 716,690 tons of CO2 
in 2004  
 
Reduced CO2 emissions 
from electricity use and 
heating by 29 per cent and 8 
per cent respectively 
between 1996 and 2002. 
 
19 per cent of 
energy from 
regenerative 
sources. 
 
Royal Bank of Not documented Reduced energy-related Reduce energy-
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Scotland  emissions by more than 40 
per cent between 
1990 and 2000. Sourced 16 
per cent of total energy from 
renewable electricity in 
2004. 
 
related emissions 
by 5 per cent 
between 2000 
and 2005 (in UK 
and Ireland) per 
unit of income.  
 
Westpac 136,400 tons of CO2 
in 2004. 
 
Reduced GHG emissions by 
2 per cent between 1996 and 
2004. 
 
Maintain an 
annual target of 
reducing GHG 
emissions by 5 
per cent. 
 
Source: Carbon Down, Profits Up. The Climate Group, 2005. 
 
Although the commitment to carbon neutrality for the bank’s operations is laudable, addressing 
the climate change impacts of the bank’s financial services and investments is far more 
important. Financial support for climate changing activities is by far the most significant impact 
that banks have on climate change, and any policy must focus on reducing those impacts. Even 
at JPMorganChase, there is little evidence that concern about climate change is significantly 
influencing finance or investment decisions.  
 
The picture for all banks is dim when it comes to leading a technological shift. With the 
exception of Bank of America’s portfolio reduction target, no bank has visibly made a 
commitment to shifting its portfolios in carbon intensive sectors, although more and more are 
investing in renewable energy. While the levels vary significantly, banks already financially 
supportive of renewable energy include ABN-AMRO, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner 
(through Allianz), HSBC, HVB, JPMorganChase, Mizuho, Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada 
and Westpac. Wells Fargo, for example, has recently committed to fund more than US$1 billion 
in environmental technologies, including renewables, over the next five years. However, many 
of these same banks are routinely funding large-scale fossil fuel and other carbon-intensive 
projects that frequently more than offset the amounts and impacts of their renewable portfolios. 
 
Banks also need to be proactive in leading others to take appropriate action on climate change; 
one welcome example of this is the participation of HSBC, ABN AMRO and Standard 
Chartered Bank in the Climate Leaders Group.87 
 
CONCLUSION 
Banks are clearly beginning to recognise the importance of addressing climate change in their 
own operations, but so far are less willing to require emission reductions from their clients. The 
two exceptions, JPMorganChase and Bank of America, have made important and strong 
commitments; even so, they still fall short of international standards and best practices in some 
respects. They therefore receive a rating of (3). Citigroup has made an important commitment to 
require its clients to report on greenhouse gas emissions, and thus receives a (2).  
 
The efforts to reduce the carbon “footprint” of banking operations is welcome, but even such a 
bold step as HSBC’s goal of carbon neutrality falls short of the steps needed to reduce climate 
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change resulting from its investments. Those banks need to apply the same leadership to their 
portfolios as they do to their operations. Those banks that have just committed to reducing 
internal climate impacts each receive a (1). Finally, all banks should develop a specific climate 
change policy because they are involved in financing sectors that affect the climate in some 
capacity, whether through their support of manufacturing, construction, transport, energy and 
utilities, the financial sector or automotive sector. 
 
Ratings 
 
3: Bank of America, JPMorganChase 
2: Citigroup 
1: ABN AMRO, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, Barclays, HSBC, HVB and Scotia Bank 
0: All other banks 
 
Summary Chart of Climate Change Standards 
Standard Origin Examples of relevant adoptions 
Climate emission accounting 
and reporting 
UNFCC, Kyoto 
Protocol, 
GHG Protocol 
JPMorganChase, Citigroup, Bank of 
America, Climate Disclosure Project, 
European Pollutant Emission Registry,  
Setting targets for emission 
reductions 
Kyoto Protocol  Bank of America (for energy sector). See 
Box 5 for examples.  
 
Shifting portfolios towards 
climate-friendly technologies 
Millennium 
Development 
Goals, 
Bonn 
Declaration, 
UN Climate 
Convention 
Export Credit Agencies, EBRD, World 
Bank Group, General Electric-
Ecomagination, Bank of America, HSBC, 
HVB, Mizuho, Royal Bank of Canada, 
Société Général 
 
 
5. DAMS  
A. Why a dams policy is important 
Large dams and associated infrastructure are among the most controversial and potentially 
destructive of all internationally-financed projects. According to the World Commission on 
Dams (WCD), large dams have displaced between 40 and 80 million people worldwide. 
Millions more have been ousted by the construction of canals, powerhouses and other associated 
infrastructure.88 Many of these people have not been satisfactorily resettled, nor have they 
received adequate compensation, and those who have been resettled have rarely had their 
livelihoods restored.89 In the natural world, dams have fragmented and stilled 60 per cent of the 
world’s rivers, leading to profound and often irreversible impacts on riverine and adjoining 
terrestrial environments.90 Meanwhile, the economic benefits of large dams have often been 
elusive. Large dams tend to under-perform their targets for power generation, and lengthy 
construction delays and large cost overruns are routine.91  
 
In addition to these environmental, social and economic concerns, the business case for 
applying strong environmental and social standards to dam projects is compelling. Proponents 
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of environmentally and socially disruptive dam projects have increasingly met effective 
resistance from committed, well-organised and often globally-connected grassroots advocacy 
campaigns. For an industry in which cost overruns are the norm, anticipated benefits are often 
not realised, and virtually all project costs are incurred upfront, the added burdens of community 
opposition can destroy the financial justifications for the project. As a result, potential conflicts 
are best resolved by negotiations between all those whose rights are involved and who bear the 
risks of proposed projects. 
 
B. Best international standards 
The most authoritative and broadly supported set of standards to be applied to dam and water 
projects are the guidelines articulated by the WCD. This body was convened by the World Bank 
and IUCN, the World Conservation Union, and comprised 12 eminent members drawn from a 
broad spectrum of stakeholders.92 
 
The centrepieces of the Commission’s recommendations were its “rights and risks” approach to 
project decision-making, and its seven strategic priorities and supporting principles. Four of 
these seven priorities can be applied to other sectors and are appropriate for inclusion in an 
environmental and social management system: (1) gaining public acceptance; (2) assessing all 
options; (3) recognising entitlements and sharing benefits; and (4) ensuring compliance. We 
have recommended that these core WCD recommendations be incorporated into an overall 
management system (see section II, part 13). The three guidelines more specific to the water and 
dam sector are: 
 
1. Addressing existing dams: Opportunities should be taken to optimise benefits from 
existing dams, address outstanding social issues and strengthen environmental 
mitigation and restoration measures. 
 
2. Sustaining rivers and livelihoods: Options assessment and decision-making around 
river development should prioritise the avoidance of impacts, followed by the 
minimisation and mitigation of harm to the health and integrity of the river system. 
Avoiding impacts through good site selection and project design is a priority.  
 
3. Sharing rivers for peace, development and security: The use and management of 
resources should be the subject of agreement between states to promote mutual self-
interest for regional cooperation and peaceful collaboration. Dams on shared rivers 
should not be built where riparian states raise objections that are upheld by international 
panels. 
 
C. Application to the banking sector 
Financial institutions that provide assistance to dams and associated infrastructure projects 
should adopt a sectoral policy based upon the WCD recommendations. This policy should apply 
to all dams (the WCD considered only dams more than 15 metres high) and to all associated 
infrastructure.  
 
The WCD considered the implications of its findings for private sector financiers, and provided 
a set of recommendations for them to follow. First, it called upon financial institutions to use 
comprehensive options assessments as a risk mitigation tool. Second (and most important), it 
called upon financial institutions to incorporate the WCD principles, criteria and guidelines into 
their environmental and social policies, and to use the guidelines as minimum screens for 
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evaluating support for, and investment in, individual projects. Third, it recommended that 
financial institutions develop legally binding environmental and social provisions in their 
insurance coverage, and their debt and equity arrangements. Finally, the WCD recommended 
that banks develop criteria for bond-rating systems for use in financing all options, including 
large dams, in the water resources and electric power sectors.93 
 
D. Assessing the banking sector  
HSBC is the only bank in this survey that has developed a sector-specific policy on freshwater 
infrastructure, including dams. HSBC’s policy references the WCD principles and requires that 
all new applicable project finance proposals fall within its requirements. HSBC will not provide 
facilities and other forms of financial assistance, including any involvement in debt and equity 
capital markets and advisory roles, to dams that do not conform with the WCD framework for 
decision-making. The policy further precludes support for dam projects that are located in, or 
substantially impact upon, critical natural habitats, Ramsar-listed wetlands and UNESCO World 
Heritage Sites. 
 
The Equator Principles do not incorporate the recommendations of the WCD, and provide little 
sector-specific guidance. Rather, they address only environmental assessment issues, dam 
safety, and how to gain the approval of neighbouring states for projects with transboundary 
impacts.94  
 
CONCLUSION 
HSBC is the only bank to adopt a publicly available policy specifically aimed at the impacts of 
dams. By committing to the WCD principles, it receives the highest rating of (4) for its policy. 
Although the policy is strong, it is too early to determine how it will be implemented. The lack 
of an explicit dams policy is particularly troubling for banks such as Standard Chartered that are 
active in the industry. ABN AMRO and Barclays are also active in the sector, but Barclays has a 
confidential internal policy on the environmental and social risks associated with dams and 
ABN AMRO is currently developing a policy in consultation with interested public 
stakeholders. The Equator Principles and the underlying IFC safeguard policies, if fully 
implemented, would require options assessment, steps to ensure dam safety, and consultation 
with neighbouring states. However, because neither the Principles nor the IFC safeguard 
policies adopt the rights-based approach endorsed by the WCD, the Equator Banks generally 
fall short of the international standard and receive a (2). 
 
Ratings 
 
4: HSBC 
2: Equator Principle Banks 
0: All other banks 
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Summary Chart of Standards Relating to Dams 
Standard Origin Examples of adoption 
Sustainable river basin 
management (adoption of 
WCD priorities) 
World Commission on Dams 
(WCD) 
OPIC, European Investment 
Bank, EBRD, HSBC, US 
Export-Import Bank95 
Optimise benefits from 
existing dams 
WCD International Hydropower 
Association (IHA)96 
International Energy Agency 
(IEA) Hydropower 
Agreement, HSBC  
Avoidance and mitigation of 
impacts 
WCD IEA Hydropower 
Agreement,97 HSBC 
Comprehensive assessment, 
including precautionary 
approach 
WCD IHA, IEA Hydropower 
Agreement, HSBC, Equator 
Principles  
Benefit sharing with affected 
communities 
WCD IHA,98 International 
Commission on Large Dams 
(ICOLD),99 HSBC 
 
Public acceptance and consent WCD ICOLD,100 HSBC 
 
 
6. BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION 
A. Why is a biodiversity policy important? 
The planet’s biological diversity – its ecosystems, species and genetic material – is an integrated 
and intricate web of life that provides substantial economic, cultural, recreational and ecological 
benefits to humanity. The relentless and accelerating loss of this biodiversity is one of the 
world’s most pressing environmental concerns. Quite apart from the potential costs and risks of 
biodiversity loss – destruction of habitats, loss of ecosystem services and curative plant 
materials, and threats to food security – the stewardship of biodiversity is also the moral and 
ethical responsibility of humanity.  
 
Virtually all countries in the world have ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
which sets as an international goal the conservation and sustainable use of all biological 
diversity. The business sector is beginning to recognise the value and importance of protecting 
biodiversity, or at least the risk of ignoring biodiversity concerns. While companies in natural 
resource-dependent sectors – forestry, fisheries, oil, gas, mining and water – tend to be most 
aware of the potential risks, all types of companies are increasingly integrating biodiversity 
considerations into their management systems.101 Some companies are even adopting a “net 
biodiversity gain” approach. In 2003, Rio Tinto, for example, announced it would pursue this 
approach when operating in areas of high conservation value – but it has not yet clarified how it 
intends to measure this. 
 
B. Best international standards  
The CBD requires signatories to ensure that biodiversity considerations are included in their 
environmental impact assessment procedures,102 and that biodiversity impacts are routinely 
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included in both national and international environmental assessment procedures. The CBD also 
identifies three categories of biodiversity: ecosystems, species and genetic materials. Consistent 
with the CBD, a biodiversity policy should seek to protect, conserve and sustainably manage 
each of these categories.   
 
Ecosystem and habitat protection 
A number of international agreements require the protection of natural ecosystems and habitats. 
The CBD requires all member countries to establish a system of protected areas or areas where 
special measures must be taken to conserve biodiversity, and otherwise to promote the 
protection of ecosystems and natural habitats.103 The Law of the Sea Convention obliges all 
signatories to protect and preserve the marine environment. Two other global treaties protect 
listed areas. The World Heritage Convention protects listed natural and cultural sites of global 
importance, and the Ramsar Convention provides for the protection, conservation and 
appropriate use of listed wetlands of international importance. Regional agreements also 
emphasise the importance of habitat protection generally,104 and many governments have 
adopted action plans and other initiatives, such as the International Coral Reefs Initiative. 
 
To consolidate and systematise those natural areas that should be protected for the conservation 
of biological diversity, IUCN, the World Conservation Union, has developed a category system 
for protected areas that provides important guidance for how the private sector should operate in 
these areas. In 2000 the IUCN World Conservation Congress adopted a resolution calling on all 
states to ban investments in extractive projects in protected areas set aside for conservation 
purposes (Categories I-IV, see Annex X). 
 
Some public agencies, such as the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), have 
established policies not to finance projects in World Heritage Sites, Ramsar areas and IUCN 
category I-IV areas.105 Similarly, some governments, such as the Philippines, have outlawed 
mining in IUCN I-IV areas.106 Increasingly, extractives companies are committing not to 
develop mineral resources in specific “no-go zones”. For instance, 15 mining companies active 
in the International Council for Metals and Minerals (ICMM) have agreed not to invest in, or 
open, mines in World Heritage Sites.107  
 
Species protection 
The IUCN Species Survival Commission produces The Red List of Threatened Species, the 
most comprehensive and authoritative global survey of plants and animals at risk. The Bonn 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals requires conservation of 
habitat and restrictions on the exploitation of any listed endangered migratory species. The 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) 
prohibits international commercial trade in all species listed as endangered and requires the 
strict regulation of such trade for species designated as threatened. Other global and regional 
conventions ban or restrict the commercial exploitation of whales, migratory birds, polar bears, 
sea turtles and fur seals, among others.108 
 
In addition to protecting threatened species, protecting biodiversity requires that common 
species are not over-harvested and that the commercial exploitation of all living resources is 
sustainable. The CBD, for example, requires countries to regulate or manage all biological 
resources “with a view to ensuring their conservation and sustainable use”. This requirement of 
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sustainable management and use appears in many other instruments addressing the whole range 
of living natural resources, including forests,109 fisheries110 and many species of wildlife and 
plants, and is thus firmly established as an international guiding principle.  
 
Species diversity is also threatened by both the accidental and intentional introduction of 
invasive alien species. When introduced outside their natural habitats, these species have the 
ability to establish themselves, out-compete natives and take over their new environments. 
Invasive alien species are found all over the world, but are a particular problem for island 
ecosystems. Both the Law of the Sea Convention111 and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
require member states to prevent, eradicate or control the introduction of invasive alien 
species.112 
 
Genetic materials protection 
The CBD requires its signatories to regulate, manage or control the risks associated with the use 
and release of living modified organisms. As part of this obligation, member states adopted the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in January 2000. The Cartagena Protocol sets out a framework 
for the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms that may have adverse 
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, human health and 
transboundary risks, and requires the advance informed consent of any country before any living 
modified organism is imported.113 
 
Access and benefit-sharing 
The CBD requires companies seeking access to genetic resources to obtain the prior informed 
consent of the country of origin, and to operate under mutually agreed access and benefit 
sharing agreements. 114 See also the discussion of informed consent with respect to indigenous 
people in Part II.3. above. 
 
C. Application to the banking sector  
The banking sector has a significant impact on biodiversity, particularly those banks that 
provide financial support to high-impact sectors such as forestry, mining, oil and gas, fisheries, 
water delivery and infrastructure, or sectors that are using genetic resources such as 
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, agriculture or cosmetics. Banks should adopt policies that take 
into account the protection of biodiversity (including ecosystems, species and genetic resources) 
as reflected in international conventions and national laws. Banks should establish biodiversity 
policies aimed at achieving the consensus goals of the CBD and other international instruments 
– namely, the conservation and protection of biodiversity, the sustainable management and use 
of biodiversity, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from biodiversity. 
 
To meet international standards, such a policy should at a minimum include: 
 
• an assessment process that evaluates cumulative biodiversity impacts upstream and 
downstream (including impacts on ecosystems, species and genetic resources); 
• requirements that investments and financial services provided by the bank do not  
negatively impact upon any of the protected areas covered by the IUCN I-IV categories, 
UNESCO World Heritage and the Ramsar Convention. In particular, industrial 
extractive projects such as mining, oil, gas and forestry should not be financed within 
World Heritage Sites and IUCN I-IV protected areas, nor where they negatively impact 
upon those sites and areas; 
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• exclusions of any project that (i) could have an impact at a community or population 
level on a species identified on the IUCN Red List; (ii) could lead to the commercial 
trade of any species listed as endangered under CITES; or (iii) is likely to involve the 
intentional or unintentional introduction of invasive alien species;  
• requirements that all living natural resources such as fish, forests, animals and plants be 
used and managed sustainably; 
• prohibition on support for the production or trade in any living modified organism 
except with the approval of the importing country and as otherwise required under the 
Cartagena Protocol; 
• requirement that any activity involving access to genetic resources meets the consent 
and benefit-sharing requirements found in the CBD; 
• requirement that the project does not lead any member country to violate any 
international treaty relating to biological diversity; and 
• requirement that the facility’s management systems ensure the collection of baseline 
data and provide for the ongoing monitoring and reporting of impacts at least consistent 
with the guidelines found in the Global Reporting Initiative for reporting on biodiversity 
and land use.  
 
D. Assessing bank performance  
Banks that have agreed to the Equator Principles are committed to assessing the impacts of their 
projects on biodiversity and to avoiding significant conversion or degradation of critical natural 
habitats. However, the definition of what is “significant” leaves considerable room for 
interpretation and has led to criticism of the IFC’s policy. The adoption of clear “no-go zones” 
for World Heritage Sites, IUCN Categories I-IV and habitats for species listed in the IUCN Red 
List would help correct this shortcoming, but few banks have supplemented their commitments 
to the Principles in this way. In addition, all banks need to consider impacts on biodiversity 
habitat areas affected by transactions as part of their risk management system. 
 
Three banks – ABN AMRO, HSBC and JPMorganChase – go beyond what is required by the 
Equator Principles to address biodiversity issues through sector-specific policies such as forests 
and water. Each of these banks recognises certain no-go zones and undertakes not to finance 
some operations in these areas. HSBC’s policy goes the furthest, committing the bank not to 
finance forest operations or infrastructure projects affecting World Heritage Sites and Ramsar 
wetland areas. Unfortunately, its policy does not extend to the extractives industry, or to other 
potentially harmful projects. 
 
ABN AMRO states that it will not finance mining and, in principle, oil and gas projects in 
World Heritage Sites. Similarly, JPMorganChase will not finance extractives or commercial 
logging operations in World Heritage Sites. These policies can be strengthened if World 
Heritage Sites, Ramsar areas and IUCN categories I-IV were recognised as off limits for all 
extractive, infrastructure and forest-related investments or any other investment that would 
negatively impact the area’s biodiversity values.  
 
The only bank to address species protection directly is HSBC, which has committed not to 
finance commercial logging operations that affect species covered by CITES. However, the 
CITES lists are limited to those species endangered or threatened by international trade. It 
would therefore be preferable to have a policy that references species listed on IUCN’s Red List 
and the FAO’s list of overfished species. HSBC’s policy could thus be strengthened if it were 
expanded beyond logging to include any impact or transaction affecting any endangered, 
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threatened or overexploited species covered by CITES, the IUCN Red List, or categorised by 
the FAO as overfished. 
 
None of the banks’ policies requires that access to genetic resources be based on a host 
country’s consent and a benefit-sharing agreement, nor does any protect the rights of indigenous 
people to genetic and cultural knowledge, as addressed by the Biosafety Protocol and the CBD 
respectively. 
 
CONCLUSION 
None of the existing biodiversity-related policies reflects a comprehensive and adequate 
approach to biodiversity. Issues relating to invasive species and genetically modified organisms, 
for example, are not addressed in any of the policies. ABN AMRO, HSBC and JPMorganChase 
have surpassed their peers by recognising the importance of “no-go zones” in at least some 
circumstances. But even those three have put unnecessary restrictions on their approach to “no-
go zones”. Of the three, HSBC’s policy is the most comprehensive because it includes 
provisions relating to the protection of endangered species listed under CITES. HSBC’s policy 
thus warrants a (2), while ABN AMRO and JPMorganChase each receives a (1). Given the 
impacts on biodiversity from many different sectors, all banks must adopt a separate 
biodiversity protection policy to mitigate these impacts. 
 
Ratings 
 
2: HSBC  
1: ABN AMRO; JPMorganChase 
0: All other banks 
 
Summary Chart of Biodiversity Standards 
Standard Origin Examples of Adoption 
Assessment of biodiversity 
impacts 
CBD, World Bank Group World Bank Group, Rio 
Tinto, Equator Principle 
Banks 
IUCN I-IV 
 
OPIC 
 
World Heritage Convention 
 
ABN-AMRO, HSBC, 
JPMorganChase,  Shell, 
Freeport, Placer Dome, OPIC 
Ecosystem and habitat 
protection 
Ramsar Convention HSBC, OPIC 
Protection of endangered 
species 
IUCN Red List, 
CITES, CMS 
 
 
HSBC (follows CITES) 
Sustainable use of living 
natural resources 
CBD, Straddling Stocks, 
UNCLOS, CITES 
HSBC (follows CITES) 
Prevention of invasive species UNCLOS, CBD,   
Consent and benefit-sharing 
for access to genetic resources  
CBD  
Genetically modified 
organisms 
Biosafety Protocol  
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7. FOREST PROTECTION  
A. Why a forest policy is important 
More than 30 per cent of the Earth’s surface is covered by forests. Forests support rich 
biological diversity, are host to endangered and threatened species, improve water quality and 
store large quantities of greenhouse gases. When cleared, cut or burned, a forest’s ecological 
services are destroyed, at least temporarily, and significant greenhouse gases may be released 
into the atmosphere. Forests also have a variety of direct uses to people, including the provision 
of home and shelter, wood and wood products, pharmaceuticals and recreation. 
 
Rapid deforestation and conversion to agriculture or other uses threaten many of the world’s 
natural forests. Industrial-scale logging and agriculture operations are capital-intensive 
endeavours, often requiring significant financial assistance. Just as many businesses have 
developed forest management policies to reduce their contribution to forest loss, commercial 
banks must also adopt policies that ensure they are not financing unsustainable practices in 
forest ecosystems. 
 
B. Best international standards 
The international community, including almost all governments, has agreed that forests and 
forest resources should be managed sustainably.115 Critical aspects of sustainable forest 
management incorporate comprehensive assessment of environmental and social values and 
impacts associated with proposed transactions. This includes identifying and protecting High 
Conservation Value Forests (HCVFs) and eliminating any impacts on endangered species listed 
under CITES. Also critical to sustainable forest management is compliance with international 
and national laws, particularly those intended to end illegal logging, the adoption of independent 
certification processes, and the elimination of large-scale forest conversions for agricultural and 
other purposes. 
 
Certification 
The emergence of independent certification processes has been critical to sustainable forest 
management. Forest certification is a system of forest inspection and tracking timber and paper 
through a “chain of custody” – following the raw material through to the finished product, to 
ensure that it has come from forests that are sustainably managed.  Forest certification is widely 
seen as one of the most important initiatives of the last decade to promote better forest 
management. 
 
While an increasing number of certification schemes have emerged, the standards of the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) are considered to be the most credible and have been widely 
adopted. The FSC Standards (see Box 7) apply to all tropical, temperate and boreal forests, as 
well as to plantations and partially replanted forests. By September 2005, more than 59 million 
hectares of forests had been certified for sustainable management practices by the FSC.116 
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BOX 6:  Forest Stewardship Council standards 
 
1.   Compliance with laws 
2.   Tenure and use rights 
3.   Indigenous people’s rights 
4.   Community relations and workers’ rights 
5.   Benefits from the forest 
6.   Environmental impact 
7.   Management plan 
8.   Monitoring and assessment 
9.   Maintenance of high conservation value forests 
10. Plantations 
 
See www.fsc.org for full description of the principles. 
 
Illegal logging 
Illegal logging is a major problem in many forest-dependent countries, and is a significant 
obstacle to reducing deforestation. It not only results in a loss of forests, but also in substantial 
economic losses for forest-rich countries. It is estimated that these countries lose between 
US$10-15 billion a year in taxes, licences and royalties to illegal logging. In the Congo Basin 
and Russian Far East, as much as 50 per cent of felled timber is believed to be illegal; in 
Indonesia, it may be as high as 80 per cent.117 Adopting the FSC standards and certification 
requirements is an effective way to combat illegal logging because of the requirements to track 
and disclose the chain of custody. 
 
Conversion: palm oil and soy plantations 
During the last two decades, more than 300 million hectares of tropical forests – an area larger 
than India – have been cleared for plantations (including palm oil and soy), agriculture, pasture, 
mining or urban development.118 The conversion of forests to other land uses comes with severe 
environmental and social costs arising from forest clearing, uncontrolled burning, haze-induced 
public health problems and disregard for the rights and interests of local communities. 
 
Palm oil and soybean cultivation are two of the largest culprits in this deforestation. Oil palm is 
the fastest growing crop in the tropics. Soybean cultivation has also exploded: the area 
cultivated in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay has more than doubled over the past 10 
years. While palm oil and soy plantations play an important role in the economic development 
of many countries, conservation and forest protection practices must be adopted to avoid 
exacerbating forest degradation and deforestation. Two multi-stakeholder initiatives – the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and the Roundtable on Responsible Soy – are under way to 
address the problems associated with palm oil and soy plantations. Both initiatives include 
active participation of the respective industries, as well as NGOs.119   
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C. Application to the banking sector 
WWF has previously published a report that translates international standards and best practice 
related to the forest sector into recommendations for the financial sector. 120 Banks involved in 
such activities should develop sector-specific policies that require their clients at a minimum to: 
 
• comply with all national laws and international conventions; 
• commission an independent assessment of the proposed activities’ environmental and 
social impacts relating to forests; 
• require that all forest practices or products reflect sustainable forest management 
practices that are certified or in the process of being certified by FSC or another 
credible certification scheme; 
• where FSC or equivalent certification is not in place, a commitment should be sought 
from the client to develop a time-bound certification action plan with independent third-
party verification by the FSC;  
• implement a transparent and systematic wood tracking system, with periodic reviews of 
the “chain of custody” to ensure that the client is not inadvertently involved in, 
colluding with or purchasing timber from illegal logging operations; 
• avoid any activity that damages, degrades or negatively impacts upon primary or High 
Conservation Value Forests, or forests in proposed or legally designated protected areas 
or buffer zones. Banks should require clients to have an independent assessment of 
impacted areas to delineate any high conservation value forests and establish a plan for 
their protection;
121 
• avoid  all activities and trade related to CITES-listed species; 
• avoid forest conversion for commercial export products;  
• respect local communities and the rights of indigenous people; and 
• implement responsible labour policies and practices. 
 
Such policies should apply to all sectors with activities that directly or indirectly affect the 
environmental and social qualities of forests. These include sectors with indirect impacts such as 
agricultural plantations (soy or oil palm plantations, for example), large-scale livestock grazing, 
aquaculture farming such as shrimp, extractive industries, land development, infrastructure 
development and tourism. 
  
D. Assessing bank performance  
The signatories to the Equator Principles have agreed to ensure that the operations they finance 
and that affect forests are consistent with IFC’s existing forestry policy. The IFC’s policy 
currently prohibits financing any logging in primary tropical moist forests – but it is likely that 
the IFC will drop this ban in its new Performance Standards. The IFC policy also prohibits 
support for any forest sector project that contravenes the international environmental 
agreements of the country. 
 
Eight banks have promulgated policies to supplement their commitments under the Equator 
Principles. These are ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Barclays, Citibank, HSBC, ING, 
JPMorganChase and Rabobank. Of these, the policies of HSBC and ABN AMRO extend to a 
broader definition of forests and activities than do the others. HSBC’s policy makes it clear that 
it will not support commercial logging operations in, or purchases from, primary tropical forests 
and High Conservation Value Forests, or any operations that impact upon species protected by 
CITES. ABN AMRO’s policy is even broader, stating that the bank will not finance operations 
that result in resource extraction from, or the clearing of either primary or high conservation 
 
47 
 
 
 
value forests, which also includes impacts on primary forests in temperate and boreal regions. 
ABN AMRO also applies its policy to all projects that impact upon forests, including not only 
forest sector projects but also  agricultural plantations and oil, gas and mining projects. 
ABN AMRO, HSBC and JPMorganChase also recognise the importance of third party 
certification. HSBC and JPMorganChase give preference to the FSC – although HSBC allows 
an equivalent system in countries where the FSC certification is not available. HSBC also 
makes clear that it will consider exiting relationships if clients do not have FSC or equivalent 
certification, or can demonstrate that they are taking action to achieve it. 
 
The American banks – Bank of America, Citibank and JPMorganChase – have very similar 
policies that share a more limited focus on avoiding projects in primary tropical moist forests 
only. Bank of America also includes a commitment not to finance in areas identified as intact 
forests by the World Resources Institute. 
 
All banks with separate forest policies recognise the threat of illegal logging and commit to 
reviewing the client’s record in this respect, as well as to following local, national and in some 
cases international law, to varying degrees. These policies should be strengthened by fully 
adopting the standards set out by the FSC for certification, managing and protecting primary 
forests and forests of high conservation value, as well as requiring third party monitoring and 
audits. 
 
Several banks also address the problem of converting forests to agricultural uses. ABN 
AMRO’s policy is by far the clearest: it prohibits ABN AMRO from financing projects on 
previously cleared forest land for five years and then only if no direct link to the original 
deforestation can be demonstrated. Citibank and JPMorganChase will finance plantations only 
on heavily degraded forest land or on non-forested land, but that can include previously planted 
areas. Bank of America’s policy curiously applies the five-year waiting period as an exception 
for tree plantations proposed on what were illegally deforested lands. ING and Rabobank have 
narrower policies prohibiting support for palm oil plantations on previously forested land that 
has been cleared within the past three years. ING’s policy also contains a clause that allows all 
plantations in Indonesia to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Such a caveat allows lax 
application and creates loopholes that banks should avoid. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The existing IFC policies underlying the Equator Principles include important standards of 
forest conservation, including a ban on commercial logging in primary tropical moist forests.  
 
Of the eight banks’ forest-related policies, ABN AMRO’s appears to be the most 
comprehensive with respect to the scope of activities it encompasses and of forests to which it 
applies. HSBC’s policy is arguably stronger than the rest, with a more explicit approach to FSC 
certification – although it fails to address the conversion of forest land to agriculture. ING and 
Rabobank have the weakest policies. Theirs primarily address palm oil plantations, due in part 
to their prior activity in financing oil palm plantations in countries such as Indonesia. Barclays’ 
policy is difficult to compare with others or with international standards, as it has not been 
released to the public. The policy reportedly references FSC standards, but because of the lack 
of public disclosure it receives no higher than a (1).   
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Other banks lack a policy altogether, even though they invest extensively in the forest sector. 
These include BBVA, CIBC, KBC, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland, Scotia 
Bank and Standard Chartered. Scotia Bank has indicated that it is currently developing a forest 
policy and consulting NGOs. 
 
Ratings 
 
3: ABN AMRO and HSBC 
2: Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorganChase, Rabobank 
1: Barclays, ING 
0: Barclays, BBVA, CIBC, KBC, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
Scotia Bank, Standard Chartered and all other banks 
 
Summary Chart of Forest Standards 
Standard Origin Examples of Adoption 
FSC certification standards Forest Stewardship Council Ikea, Home Depot, OBI, 
B&Q, Big Creek Lumber, 
HSBC 
Prevent illegal logging  FSC ABN AMRO, Bank of 
America, HSBC, 
JPMorganChase  
Protect critical forest habitats FSC OPIC122 
Belgian ECA123, HSBC 
Prevent harvesting of 
endangered species 
CITES HSBC 
Minimising forest conversion 
from palm oil and soy 
Roundtable for Sustainable 
Palm Oil (forthcoming) 
 
 
Roundtable for Responsible 
Soy 
Unilever, Cadbury 
Schweppes, Malaysian Palm 
Oil Association124 
Coop Switzerland, Grupo 
Maggi, Unilever125 
ABN AMRO 
Monitoring and reporting FSC  
 
 
8. FISHERIES 
A. Why a fisheries policy is important 
Many of the world’s fisheries are in dire condition. More than 76 per cent are overfished, fished 
to their limit or recovering from overfishing. Certain important commercial fisheries such as 
North Atlantic cod, Patagonian toothfish, swordfish and bluefin tuna have either crashed or are 
showing signs of significant decline. Some practices such as driftnet fishing, have huge impacts 
on many non-target fish species as well as sea turtles, seabirds and marine mammals, while 
others such as bottom-trawling destroy ocean habitats necessary for maintaining or recovering 
marine biodiversity. At the same time, the global fishing fleet is estimated to be more than twice 
as large as necessary to catch what the ocean can sustainably produce.   
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B. Best international standards 
Several international treaties, as well as agreements, action plans and codes of conduct 
negotiated under the auspices of the FAO, set out a clear and comprehensive international 
consensus on many aspects of fisheries management. This consensus, enshrined in the Law of 
the Sea Convention,126 the Straddling Stocks Agreement127 and a variety of other instruments, 128 
sets a clear goal of achieving the sustainable management and use of the world’s fisheries. 
Widespread consensus also exists on the following principles and measures necessary for 
achieving that goal. 
 
Certification of sustainable fisheries 
The leading effort for certifying sustainable marine fisheries is the Marine Stewardship Council, 
which is based on the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (the FAO Fisheries 
Code) and developed through broad international consultation. So far, the MSC has certified 13 
fisheries and has 23 under review. The MSC also employs a  product tracking mechanism that 
can help trace chain of custody and ensure fish are coming from legal sources. 
 
Ecosystem approach to sustainable fisheries management 
International standards for fisheries management have evolved from emphasising particular fish 
stocks to an ecosystem approach. Thus, for example, the Straddling Stocks Agreement not only 
requires the sustainable management of particular stocks, but also the assessment and 
conservation of non-target species in the same ecosystem.129 Similarly, the FAO Fisheries Code 
requires users of living aquatic resources to “conserve aquatic ecosystems” and “not only [to] 
ensure the conservation of target species but also of species belonging to the same ecosystem or 
associated with or dependent upon the target species”.130 Additionally, the FAO has endorsed a 
comprehensive Ecosystem Based Management (EBM) framework for marine capture fisheries 
developed by WWF.131 The FAO Fisheries Code also issues guidelines on measures to maintain 
livelihoods of inshore fishing in the poorest nations’ communities. 
 
Precautionary approach to sustainable fisheries management 
Emerging international standards for fisheries management recognise the inherent uncertainties 
associated with questions regarding the health, reproductive rates or populations of, or fishing 
impacts on, target and associated species. As a result, the Straddling Stocks Agreement, the 
FAO Fisheries Code and the WWF EBM all adopt the precautionary approach to fisheries 
management. Uncertainty or an absence of adequate scientific information (over the exploitation 
of deep-sea species, for example) should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to 
take conservation or management measures. Such uncertainty may exist in any fishery but 
particularly in new or exploratory fisheries.132 
 
Eliminating overfishing and restoring stocks 
Under the Straddling Stocks Agreement, states are obligated to “prevent or eliminate 
overfishing”.133 Conservation and management decisions for fisheries should be based on the 
best scientific evidence available and should be directed at maintaining or restoring stocks.134  
States and fisheries managers should make every effort to restore critical habitats or others 
adversely affected by human activities.135 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
Eliminating and avoiding overcapitalisation 
Overcapitalisation of fishing fleets, often supported by large subsidies, is a recognised driver of 
overfishing in many regions of the world. Governments have consented in the Straddling Stocks 
Agreement to take measures to prevent or eliminate excess fishing capacity and to ensure that 
fishing efforts do not exceed those commensurate with the sustainable use of fishery 
resources.”136 Governments at the FAO agreed to “review the capacity of fishing fleets in 
relation to sustainable yields of fisher resources and where necessary reduce these fleets.”137 
 
Eliminating destructive fishing practices 
The FAO Fisheries Code accords a general priority to selective and environmentally safe fishing 
gear and practices,138 recommends measures to phase out the use of any irresponsible gear, 
methods or practices,139 and calls for the assessment of impacts on habitats before new fishing 
gear is introduced on a commercial scale. International standards have also been identified for 
restricting or banning certain types of fishing practices or gear, including the use of explosives 
or cyanide fishing,140 the use of driftnets,141 high seas bottom-trawling, and shark-finning. 142 
 
Minimising by-catch 
By-catch is the amount of non-target species caught and typically discarded while fishing for 
other species. The industry average for all fisheries is 250g of by-catch for every 1kg of target 
species.143 Some fishing practices such as shrimp trawling lead to as much as 3kg of wasted fish 
or non-fish species for every 1kg of target species. The Fisheries Code states that users of 
aquatic ecosystems “should minimise waste, catch of non-target species, both fish and non-fish 
species, and impacts on associate or dependent species”. Action plans have been adopted to 
reduce the impact on by-catch of certain species or groups of species, including seabirds and sea 
turtles. 144 
 
IUU fishing and flags of convenience 
A significant problem in fisheries management is the illegal, unregulated or unreported (IUU) 
fishing conducted in violation of international or national fisheries conservation measures. This 
often involves vessels registered under “flags of convenience” in countries that are notoriously 
lax in their regulations. The FAO’s Plan of Action on IUU fishing seeks to eliminate the 
practice in part by encouraging states to prohibit doing business with companies engaged in 
IUU fishing. The recent WWF Report on IUU fishing, The Changing Nature of High Seas 
Fishing,145 highlights Citibank, HSBC and Merrill Lynch as among the 20 largest shareholders 
of Pacific Andes, a company with known links to IUU vessels. The report recommends that the 
banking sector should ensure it supports only legal operations by requiring the catch to be 
documented through the full chain of custody. 
 
Marine Protected Areas 
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are now recognised as critical for maintaining and restoring 
fish and other marine biodiversity. Some MPAs are designed to be “no-take zones” where fish 
and their habitat can be restored over time, thus serving as reservoirs for the rest of the ocean. 
Banks should help sustain these areas by not supporting any activity that would negatively 
impact upon any MPA. 
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Endangered species 
Commercial trade in many fish species, including some that are commercially important, is now 
either banned or restricted under CITES (discussed in the section on biological diversity). The 
FAO Fisheries Code also recognises the particular importance of protecting endangered 
species.146 
 
Sustainable aquaculture 
Although aquaculture has been heralded as important for diversifying income and diet in many 
coastal communities, it can also have substantial impacts on sensitive coastal wetlands, water 
quality and the genetic diversity of native fish. The Fisheries Code calls on states to ensure that 
adverse environmental impacts of aquaculture are assessed and minimised.147 Resources should 
also be used responsibly – for example, where some types of aquaculture have unsustainable 
protein conversion rations (salmon require 3kg of protein for every 1kg of salmon produced; 
tuna require 10kg). Aquaculture investments should be directed towards herbivorous fish 
species such as catfish and tilapia. Multi-stakeholder roundtables convened by WWF are 
working to develop consensus-based standards for salmon and shrimp aquaculture. If 
successful, these should form the basis for future bank lending. 
 
C. Application to the banking sector 
Banks active in this sector should adopt a policy that commits them to the internationally 
accepted goal of the sustainable management and use of fisheries. The policy should require 
fisheries to be sustainably managed according to ecosystem-based and precautionary 
approaches, and certified where possible by the MSC or other independent sustainability 
certification systems. Clients should be screened to ensure that they do not participate in 
overfishing any resource, use destructive or wasteful fishing practices, operate in an over-
capitalised fishery, or practice illegal, unregulated or unreported fishing. The policy should also 
require catch documentation schemes to be used to verify the legality of fishing operations, 
support “no commercial fishing” zones in and around Marine Protected Areas, and prohibit 
trade in endangered or threatened species. In addition, the policy should address the 
environmental and social impacts of all fishing and related activities, including aquaculture. 
 
The banking sector has an obligation, and is particularly well suited, to address issues of 
capitalisation and overfishing. Commercial bank screening for proposed fisheries investment 
should include a review of the capacity of fishing fleets in relation to the sustainability of the 
fishery. In this way, banks would be sure to avoid contributing to, or exacerbating, 
overcapitalisation in any fishery. 
 
The FAO identifies bankers and insurers as important targets for efforts to combat fishing by 
vessels flagged under the authority of countries with lax resource conservation laws.148 The 
FAO Fisheries Code, for example, discourages financial institutions from requiring as a loan or 
mortgage condition, fishing vessels to be flagged in a jurisdiction other than that of the country 
of beneficial ownership, where such a requirement would increase the likelihood of non-
compliance with international conservation and management measures.149 In general, banks 
should ensure that their support is not going to companies that operate under such flags of 
convenience. 
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Finally, it is critical that the banking sector considers the impacts of its investments in seafood 
throughout the chain of custody. Sustainable investment is required for seafood businesses 
whether at the catching, processing, transport, retailing or food service points of the chain. The 
banking sector can foster sustainability, for example by requiring proof of legal activity or by 
promoting MSC certification throughout the chain of custody. 
 
D. Assessing bank performance 
By signing the Equator Principles, banks have presumably accepted general obligations to 
assess the impacts of their projects on fisheries and other marine resources – but there are no 
standards in the IFC safeguard policies that address issues of overfishing or other marine 
conservation issues. Moreover, no commercial bank has yet to adopt a specific fisheries sector 
policy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As noted above, the Equator Principles do not include any provisions specific to the challenges 
of the fisheries sector, nor has any bank reviewed in this report adopted any such policy. For 
those banks lending to the fisheries industry, such as Barclays, BBVA, Citigroup, HSBC, ING, 
KBC, Merrill Lynch, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland and Standard Chartered, 
reviewing current investments along the entire chain of custody and developing a fisheries 
policy for future investments is long overdue. 
 
Ratings 
 
0: All banks 
 
Summary Chart of Fisheries Standards 
Standard  Source Application 
Sustainable fisheries 
management and certification 
UNCLOS, Straddling Stocks 
Agreement, FAO Fisheries 
Code, Marine Stewardship 
Council 
 
Ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management 
Straddling Stocks Agreement, 
FAO Fisheries Code 
 
Precautionary approach to 
fisheries management 
Straddling Stocks 
Agreements, FAO Fisheries 
Code  
 
Eliminating overfishing and 
restoring fish species 
Straddling Stocks Agreement, 
FAO Fisheries Code 
 
Eliminating destructive 
fishing practices 
FAO Fisheries Code, UN 
driftnet ban, bottom trawling 
 
 
IFC (driftnets) 
Eliminating and Avoiding 
Overcapitalisation 
Straddling Stocks Agreement, 
FAO Fisheries Code  
 
Minimise by-catch Straddling Stocks Agreement, 
FAO Fisheries Code 
 
Limit flags of convenience FAO Fisheries Code  
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Respect Marine Protected 
Areas, including no-take 
zones 
  
Protect endangered species 
and species of concern 
CITES  
Promote sustainable 
aquaculture 
FAO Fisheries Code  
 
 
9.  SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 
A. Why an agriculture policy is important 
The agricultural sector raises significant environmental and social issues. Agriculture is the 
largest source of soil degradation, pollution and habitat conversion of any human activity. It 
uses more than twice as much water as all other human activities, and it has an enormous direct 
and indirect footprint associated with pesticides and toxicity. Agriculture is also responsible for 
between 25 and 40 per cent of all global climate change. Increased consumption of natural 
resources in new markets (Brazil, Russia, India and China – the BRICs) is increasing the 
economic demand for agricultural commodities.  
 
In addition to environmental concerns, there are growing questions about labour and other social 
impacts of agriculture (terms of trade, asset development, equity and debt, for example) and 
questions about the role of banks as both positive and negative vehicles for social change. 
Because of the breadth and scale of impacts, and because not all impacts from agriculture are 
likely to be addressed in other policies, banks active in the agricultural sector should develop 
separate agriculture policies to promote more sustainable production and trade. 
 
B. Best international standards 
Some important international standards applicable to the agricultural sector are addressed in 
other policies such as forests (conversion), biodiversity (habitat protection and genetically 
modified organisms), fisheries (aquaculture), water (dams and irrigation infrastructure) and 
chemicals (pesticide management). Other standards are more narrowly applicable to agriculture. 
These include general standards that promote organic agriculture or product-specific standards 
that apply to palm oil, soy, cotton, sugar, plantation pulp, salmon and shrimp. An indicator of 
their success is the degree to which they generate measurable improvements in performance 
against baseline data for key social and environmental impacts of each commodity. 
 
Promoting more sustainable agriculture through certification and ecolabels 
The demand for more sustainable agricultural products is growing, although most fill only niche 
markets at present. These products are variously described as organic, GMO-free, reduced 
impact, integrated pest management (IPM) or locally grown. The International Federation of 
Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM) has developed and led international efforts to 
implement third-party certification of “organic” agricultural products according to an elaborate 
and comprehensive Organic Guarantee System. Under that system, IFOAM accredits certifiers 
who agree to apply the IFOAM Basic Standards for Organic Production and Processing. 
Similarly, the Rainforest Alliance, Protected Harvest, and Food Alliance, among others, provide 
independent certification of sustainable agriculture.150 To date, however, the financial, social or 
environmental impacts of all these programmes are insufficiently documented to make a viable 
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business case for most financial institutions. WWF, Sustainable Finance and others are currently 
evaluating these various standards. 
 
Genetically modified organisms 
In terms of a biodiversity policy, the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity sets out some labelling and notification provisions with respect to genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs): for example, trade in living modified organisms is prohibited 
without the approval of the importing country. Signatories are also supposed to apply the 
precautionary principle to the production and use of GMOs. The parties to the Protocol continue 
to address and develop standards with respect to GMOs. The Protocol should be a starting point 
for developing standards for agricultural investments by financial institutions.   
 
Product-specific standards 
Efforts are now under way to articulate appropriate management practices for a range of 
agricultural commodities. Multi-stakeholder roundtables are developing standards for cotton, 
palm oil, sugar, coffee, cocoa, soy, salmon, shrimp and tilapia. WWF, ABN AMRO, Adidas, 
Cadbury Schweppes, GAP, HSBC, the IFC, Nutreco, Rabobank, Unilever and hundreds of other 
stakeholder groups are involved in convening and/or participating in these roundtables. 
Roundtable participants include the entire value chain of the respective industries, researchers, 
financial institutions, NGOs and other interested stakeholders. As these efforts progress, they 
should begin to define global, measurable standards for different commodities that could be 
adopted by banks. For example, as noted in the forestry policy, in late November 2005 the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil adopted principles and criteria for more sustainable palm 
oil production that should now be adopted by banks active in the sector.151 
 
C  Application to the banking sector 
Although it may be unrealistic to expect most commercial banks to finance only organic or 
GMO-free agriculture, they could and should promote more sustainable agriculture. Banks 
should make a special effort to understand how more sustainable forms of production can help 
the bottom line not only of producers but of financial institutions as well. More credit and hedge 
instruments should be made available to approved producers for more sustainable farming 
practices. 
 
Perhaps the most promising initiatives from the perspective of financial institutions are the 
emergence of the product-specific commodity roundtables. One output will be investment 
screens for the financial sector. Prior to the development of standards, banks can be active 
participants in developing and supporting initiatives for those products in which their portfolios 
are largest. Support will also be needed to scale-up these initiatives once standards are 
developed and adopted, and to reward those producers who apply the standards and better 
practices that are developed by the round tables. 
 
D.  Assessing the banking sector 
Banks with considerable exposure in agriculture include ABN AMRO/Banco Real, Banco Itaú, 
Barclays, BBVA, CIBC, Citicorp, Rabobank, Scotia Bank, Société Général, ING, KBC, Royal 
Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland and Standard Chartered. Yet, with a few exceptions, 
these banks have not adopted any sector-specific agricultural policies. Few have taken steps to 
support, much less promote, a sector shift to sustainability. 
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A few banks have supported or participated in commodity-specific roundtables. Rabobank, for 
example, has been very supportive of the roundtables in soy, cotton and sugar. ABN 
AMRO/Banco Real has participated in the cotton, sugar, and soy roundtables, and HSBC has 
been active in the palm oil and soy processes. The IFC has engaged in the roundtables on soy, 
cotton, palm oil, sugar and salmon.   
 
Ratings 
 
0: All banks 
 
Summary Chart of Sustainable Agriculture Standards 
Standard  Source Application 
Promoting and certifying 
sustainable agriculture 
IFOAM, Protected Harvest, 
Rainforest Alliance, Food 
Alliance 
 
Genetically modified 
organisms 
Cartagena Protocol  
Developing and adopting 
sustainable commodity 
production standards 
Responsible Commodities 
Initiative, Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil, and 
others 
IFC, Rabobank, ABN 
AMRO/Banco Real, HSBC 
 
 
10. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
A. Why an extractive industries policy is important 
Oil pipelines, drilling platforms, gas refineries and opencast mines often contaminate land and 
water, destroy natural habitats and have severe and long-lasting impacts on public health and 
safety, local cultures and community-based livelihoods. Extractive resource industries also 
appear to distort macroeconomic development in many countries through what is increasingly 
being understood as a “resource curse”. The combination of large unaccountable revenues, poor 
governance, corruption, inadequate distribution of revenues to local communities and local 
environmental and social costs, leave many countries poorer than before they developed their 
extractive resources. 
 
Failure to address these environmental and social impacts adequately is affecting the operations 
and profits of oil, mining and gas companies. High-profile controversies have been costly for 
communities, project sponsors and the companies that insure and finance them. For instance, in 
Peru, a Canadian mining company, Manhattan Minerals, lost US$60 million when it was forced 
to abandon a proposed mine because it failed to respect the preferences of the host 
community.152 In 2001, BHP wrote off US$416 million in Papua New Guinea after withdrawing 
from the area due to social and environmental concerns.153   
 
B. Best international standards 
Several international conventions indirectly set standards for oil, mining and gas projects, 
including the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Kyoto Protocol and the International 
Maritime Organisation’s MARPOL conventions. In addition, a number of multi-stakeholder 
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processes, some industry-led and most with active industry involvement, have resulted in 
important standards being set for extractive operations. 
 
Because oil, mining and gas projects raise issues common to many other sectors, we have 
addressed the standards relevant to extractives in other sections of this report, including those on 
human rights, indigenous people, labour, biodiversity, climate change and transparency. If these 
categories are not part of a financial institution’s policies, they must be incorporated into its 
extractives policy. In addition, several issues are more specific to extractives.  
 
Issues specific to extractives include:  
• emergency response and planning 
• revenue transparency 
 
Issues specific to mining include:  
• mining waste and disposal 
• mine closure and reclamation 
• mining certification 
 
Issues specific to oil and gas development include: 
• seismic surveys 
• double-hulled tankers 
• oil spill liabilities 
• waste management  
• gas venting and flaring 
• decommissioning pipelines and platforms 
 
 
Common issues for extractive industries  
Emergency response and planning 
Between 1983 and 2002, there were 150 significant environmental accidents in the mining 
sector alone. In many cases, companies, response bodies and communities were not fully 
prepared or sufficiently informed to deal with the incidents, thus exacerbating 
contamination problems and public health risks.154  UNEP has convened a multi-stakeholder 
initiative for the mining industry as part of its Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies 
at a Local Level (APELL) programme, which has made recommendations on good practice 
for emergency preparedness and response.155  Oil spills and releases are even more common, 
and oil spill response plans are common requirements in national legislation.  
 
Revenue transparency 
Oil, gas and mining industries are a significant source of revenue for many governments. But in 
some countries where governance is weak, extractive investments may actually contribute to 
poverty, corruption and conflict. Ensuring that citizens and host communities benefit from 
extractives investments is essential – but this requires more transparency and accountability 
concerning revenue generated and provided to the government.  
 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which includes a coalition of 
governments, companies, civil society groups and investors, has established criteria for full 
publication and verification of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and 
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mining. At present, some 20 countries dependent on oil and mineral development have pledged 
to follow the terms of the initiative.156  
 
Issues specific to mining operations 
Mining waste and disposal standards 
Many environmental problems associated with mining are related to the generation and 
management of waste. Sediments from waste dumps and tailings may be disposed of or wash  
into waterways, causing harm to fish, the surrounding ecology and water quality. Tailings often 
contain heavy metals, as well as other chemicals used in processing (such as cyanide), which 
leads to contamination and health risks. Establishing responsible waste management systems 
that err on the side of caution is therefore essential. 
 
Several international agreements and multi-stakeholder processes have addressed the problem of 
marine waste disposal and established standards and guidelines for the mining industry to 
follow. The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and 
other Matters (the London Convention) prohibits the dumping of mercury and mercury 
compounds directly into the sea, and requires special permits for dumping cyanide and heavy 
metals into the sea.157 The Extractives Industries Review (EIR), a multi-stakeholder process 
convened by the World Bank Group, recommended avoiding sub-marine tailings disposal, 
especially in island regions and areas with coral reefs. 
 
Increasingly, riverine tailings disposal is considered by many stakeholders to be unacceptable. 
The EIR recommended that riverine tailings disposal be abandoned altogether. The Mining, 
Minerals and Sustainable Development initiative (MMSD) stopped short of recommending an 
outright ban, but did endorse a presumption against riverine disposal. Mining companies such as 
BHP, Falconbridge and WMC Resources have committed not to use riverine tailings disposal in 
future projects. Legislatures and regulatory agencies in countries such as the US and Canada 
have banned the practice of dumping directly into rivers. 
 
The use of cyanide, primarily in gold processing, can contaminate water and pose other risks. 
The gold industry has developed an International Management Code for Cyanide, a voluntary 
agreement which emphasises minimising the use of cyanide, safe transport, worker health, 
safety and training, emergency response plans and third party audits.158 Adopting the Code is an 
important step in addressing the problems posed by cyanide, even though the Code lacks 
guidelines on waste disposal. The EIR also recommended that companies explore safer 
alternatives to the use of cyanide and mercury.159  
 
Closure standards and reclamation 
The way in which a mine is closed can have an impact on the surrounding community and 
ecosystem for years – potentially in perpetuity. In the United States and some other 
jurisdictions, mine closure standards require the company to provide a financial guarantee for 
clean-up, restoration and ongoing monitoring. MMSD also called on companies to address how 
a mine closure would affect the host community’s development aspirations (such as through a 
Community Development Plan), and the allocation of resources and responsibilities that would 
be required to realise them.  
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Independent verification 
Issues such as the role of mining in conflict and wars, and the overall sustainability of mining, 
have led to the development of new verification schemes. One is the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme, which requires governments to certify that shipments of rough diamonds 
are free from conflict diamonds. The Kimberley Process comprises 43 participants, including 
the EU, and accounts for as much as 99.8 per cent of the global production of rough 
diamonds.160 The certification process is a useful first step, but lacks independent monitoring 
mechanisms. A similar certification process for gold and diamond jewellery is under 
development.161 
 
WWF-Australia launched the Mining Certification Evaluation Project (MCEP) which has led to 
talks between the industry, governments and civil society regarding the feasibility of 
introducing an independent third-party certification programme to evaluate mines based on their 
environmental and social performance. This has attracted the interest and support of several 
major producers including Anglo-American, BHP Billiton, MPI Mines, Newmont, Placer 
Dome, Rio Tinto and WMC Resources.162 
 
Issues specific to oil and gas operations 
Double-hulling of oil tankers 
The use of double-hulled oil tankers is the accepted standard of marine shipment, and is 
becoming mandatory under international law. In the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989, 
the international community introduced requirements for the double-hulling of oil tankers. In 
1993, the IMO amended Annex I of MARPOL to require new oil tankers to be double-hulled, 
and large single-hull tankers to be phased out. After the Erika sank off the coast of France in 
1999, these requirements were strengthened to include the phase-out of smaller tankers and the 
elimination of single-hulled tankers by 2015. Unfortunately, the use of flags of convenience by 
some shipping companies has lowered safety and maintenance standards and crew training, and 
increased the risk of spills. 
 
Seismic surveys and marine mammals 
There is growing evidence that underwater seismic surveys can cause acoustic damage to 
whales and other marine mammals. Regional standards are being developed to reduce the 
impact from such surveys through, for example, “soft starts”, reduction of blasting, and the 
reporting of marine mammals in the area. These emerging standards for seismic surveys should 
be followed and extended to other regions.163 
 
Gas flaring and venting 
The extraction of crude oil often brings to the surface associated natural gas. In many 
developing countries this is frequently released into the atmosphere, contributing a significant 
amount of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, and resulting in staggering losses of potential 
energy.  
 
To address this problem, the World Bank and the government of Norway launched the Global 
Gas Flaring Reduction Public-Private Partnership (GGFR) in August 2002,164 developing a 
Voluntary Standard for Global Gas Flaring and Venting Reduction (the “Standard”). As an 
initial goal, the partners agreed to work to eliminate continuous flaring and venting of 
associated gas, unless there are no feasible alternatives. Once this has been achieved, the 
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Standard’s ultimate goal is to bring about continuing reductions so as to minimise continuous 
and non-continuous production flaring and venting of associated gas. The Standard sets out 
monitoring and transparency guidelines, best practice for minimising flaring and venting, and a 
recommended timeframe to adopt and implement the Standard. 
 
Decommissioning oil platforms and other infrastructure 
The IMO and the OSPAR Convention have issued standards for decommissioning offshore oil 
platforms. Among other things, platforms under a certain weight and in shallower water must be 
removed completely. Larger platforms must normally be removed as well (the Convention 
specifically bars dumping of scrap parts at sea). 
 
C. Application to the banking sector 
Extracting and producing oil, gas and minerals raise a myriad of issues and potential risks to the 
community and environment at every stage, including exploration, extraction, processing, 
disposal and rehabilitation. As an international consensus emerges for standards and norms for 
improving extractives projects, the banking sector needs to adopt strong and clear policies that 
incorporate them. WWF and the Centre for Science in Public Participation have produced a 
Framework for Responsible Mining, which provides a comprehensive analysis of 
environmental, social, community and governance issues that must be addressed in a policy for 
the mining sector.165 The banking sector should use this as a resource. 
 
D. Assessing bank performance  
Neither the Equator Principles nor the associated IFC safeguard policies provide standards 
specific to the extractives sector – although the assessment requirements in the Principles would 
presumably require assessments of the environmental and social impacts of many proposed 
extractives project. Although many banks support the extractives sector, they appear unwilling 
to move beyond the Equator Principles to address the unique risks and impacts posed by oil, 
mining and gas development. 
 
Among the commercial banks, only ABN AMRO has developed a publicly available extractives 
policy. Its strengths include a filter the bank applies to determine substantial impacts. ABN 
AMRO has also committed not to finance any mines (and “in principle” any oil and gas 
projects) located in World Heritage Sites or mines that dump tailings in river systems. The bank 
also determines the adequacy of the client’s environmental management system. That said, 
ABN AMRO’s policy falls far short of a comprehensive approach to extractives. Among other 
shortcomings, it fails to address extractives projects in other protected areas (IUCN I-IV), sub-
marine tailings disposal, community engagement, benefits and consent, mine closure or 
emergency response plans. Moreover, the gap between policy and implementation seems 
particularly high with respect to ABN AMRO’s extractives policy, given its decision to support 
the consortium in the Sakhalin II oil and gas project. 
 
The only other bank mentioning extractive industries in its public policies is JPMorganChase, 
which commits not to finance any extractive projects in World Heritage Sites. Barclays has 
internal policies that provide guidance for managing environmental and social risk in the 
mining, and oil and gas sectors. Because these policies have not been disclosed publicly, they 
cannot form the basis for meaningful comparison with ABN AMRO’s policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Given the attention to the risks and impacts of investments in the extractive industries, the banks 
are trailing behind international consensus and industry best practice in the sector. The only 
bank to address extractives as a sector is ABN AMRO, and even that policy falls far short of 
best standards and is having little visible impact on its portfolio decisions. It received a score of 
(2). JPMorganChase’s reference to extractive industries in World Heritage Sites, though 
adopting one international standard, is too narrow to warrant more than a score of (1). Having 
internal policies governing the extractive sectors earns a (1) for Barclays; this score is limited by 
the lack of policy disclosure. Particularly for banks supporting the extractives sector such as 
BNP Paribas, CIBC, Citibank, KBC, Royal Bank of Canada, Scotia Bank, Société Général and 
Standard Chartered, developing strong policies in this area should be prioritised. 
 
Ratings 
 
2: ABN AMRO 
1: Barclays, JPMorganChase 
0: BNP Paribas, CIBC, Citibank, KBC, Royal Bank of Canada, Scotia Bank, Société 
Général, Standard Chartered and all other banks 
 
Summary Chart of Extractive Industry Standards 
Standard Origin Examples of adoption 
Community participation, 
early and ongoing 
engagement and benefits 
MMSD  Rio Tinto and Normandy166 
BHP Billiton in Peru167 
Minerals Council of Australia 
OPIC 
Biodiversity protection/no-go 
zones  
World Heritage Convention, 
Ramsar Convention on 
Wetlands,  
IUCN 
 
ABN AMRO, Anglo-
American, JPMorganChase, 
Newmont, Rio Tinto and 
Shell (World Heritage Sites),  
OPIC  
Independent monitoring and 
reporting 
MMSD 
GRI Mining Sector 
Supplement 
Placer Dome (mine-specific 
reporting), ADB (policy to 
publish all monitoring reports) 
Emergency response and 
planning 
Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents 
 
UNEP APELL 
 
Revenue transparency Extractives Industries 
Transparency Initiative 
Azerbaijan, Ghana, Nigeria. 
Anglo-American, Newmont, 
Shell, TOTAL 
G8 countries 
Waste disposal standards: 
1. ban on mercury dumping at 
sea; 
2. ban on riverine tailings 
disposal; 
London Convention, 
Extractive Industries Review, 
Cyanide Code 
 
Falconbridge, WMC 
Resources, BHP  
Practice banned by US and 
Canadian governments, 
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3. avoid sub-marine tailing 
disposal, and no dumping in 
island nation territory, coral 
reefs or shallow waters; 
4. minimise and regulate use 
of cyanide 
 
BHP Billiton 
 
Mine closure and reclamation  MMSD United States 
Independent verification Kimberley Process 
Mining Certification 
Evaluation Project 
Angola, Botswana, 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Double hulling MARPOL  
Gas flaring and venting Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
Public-Private Partnership 
World Bank, Angola, 
Cameroon, Canada, Chad, 
Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Nigeria, Norway, United 
States, BP, ChevronTexaco, 
ENI, ExxonMobil,  Marathon, 
Norsk Hydro, Statoil, Shell, 
TOTAL and Sonatrach.  
 
 
 
11. CHEMICALS  
A. Why a chemicals policy is important 
With more than 75,000 chemicals in commercial use, the chemicals industry is another sector 
that challenges environmentally and socially sustainable development. Many chemicals have 
never been tested for their safety on the environment or public health. The negative impacts of 
others have been identified only after significant problems have surfaced. 
 
Some chemicals commercially manufactured or produced as by-products have led to severe 
global environmental and public health impacts. Ozone depletion, DDT’s impacts on birds and 
wildlife, bioaccumulation of PCBs and other persistent organic pollutants in the Arctic and 
elsewhere, and lead contamination in many urban areas, are just some examples of the negative 
impacts arising from the chemical sector. Many more chemicals, such as phthalates used to 
soften plastics and brominated chemicals to make flame retardants, are increasingly 
contaminating humans and wildlife. The known and potential impacts of these chemicals are 
stimulating new regulatory approaches, particularly in Europe, that may change how the 
chemical industry operates in future. 
 
B. Best international standards 
A chemicals policy needs to address several aspects, including adequate knowledge of 
chemicals in order to determine the degree of control needed (for example, toxicity data on their 
intrinsic properties); the need to control chemicals during their production, use and end of life; 
and the need for post-marketing surveillance to ensure all potentially harmful chemicals have 
been properly controlled. The policy must also act as an early warning system for future areas of 
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concern. The international community has addressed and developed benchmarks for some of 
these concerns, as described below. 
 
Regulating the production and consumption of dangerous chemicals 
International agreements have banned or are phasing out a number of particularly dangerous or 
toxic chemicals. For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, and its related amendments and revisions, prohibits the production and use of ozone-
depleting substances such as chlorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, halons and methyl 
bromide.168 The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) bans certain 
chemicals including dieldrin, chlordane, heptachlor and PCBs.169 Other agreements ban 
chemicals intended for use in warfare,170 and pesticides that are classified as highly or extremely 
hazardous.171 In addition, widely adopted action plans require the phasing-out or the strict 
regulation of other chemicals such as DDT,172 dioxins and furans,173 leaded petrol and 
asbestos.174 Moreover, many countries have restricted or banned even longer lists of chemicals. 
The FAO publishes and regularly updates a list of banned substances. Internationally restricted 
chemicals should no longer be widely produced or consumed, and all manufacturers, exporters 
and users should comply with national prohibitions and restrictions. 
 
Assessing the impacts of new and existing chemicals 
The international community is increasingly recognising the need to ensure more effective 
assessment of the long-term impacts of chemicals on public health and the environment. Thus, 
the EU and the global multi-stakeholder Strategic Approach to International Chemicals 
Management process (SAICM) are considering proposals for much stronger assessment and 
regulation of all new and existing chemicals, particularly those that are persistent and 
bioaccumulate in the environment. Such approaches will reflect a more precautionary approach 
to the introduction, manufacture and use of chemicals in products where impacts are uncertain.  
 
Sound management of chemical by-products and waste 
The international community also requires the sound management of chemicals and their by-
products and waste so as to minimise risks to public health and the environment. The 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation has set a goal of achieving this sound chemical 
management throughout the world by 2020.175 To meet this target, the SAICM process will set 
detailed goals and standards for the chemical industry that should form the basis of future 
chemicals policies in all industry sectors, including the financial sector. Banks should therefore 
require all clients in the chemical sector to show their demonstrated commitment to implement 
SAICM. 
 
In addition to the general requirement for the sound management of chemicals, international 
agreements entail more specific requirements. Under the Basel Convention, most governments 
have agreed to “minimise the generation of hazardous wastes and other wastes,” ensure 
adequate disposal and the environmentally sound management of hazardous waste, and ensure 
that all people managing hazardous waste prevent pollution.176 Stockpiles and waste containing 
listed chemicals under the Stockholm Convention must be managed in a way that is “protective 
of human health and the environment”. Hazardous waste cannot be exported to developing 
countries except in limited circumstances,177 and certain chemicals and pesticides cannot be 
exported without the prior informed consent of the importing country.178 In addition, the FAO 
has issued an International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, which 
 
63 
 
 
 
sets out internationally accepted standards for the handling, storage, use and disposal of 
pesticides.   
 
C. Application to the banking sector 
With the international negotiations of SAICM and Europe’s negotiation of REACH 
(Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals) under way, chemicals regulation and 
management is changing considerably. The growing acceptance of the precautionary approach 
and increasing concerns of long-term impacts on human health, reproduction and the 
environment means that banks supporting the chemicals industry will need to pay closer 
attention in future and ensure that their clients are following the emerging standards set forth 
above. 
 
D. Assessing bank performance 
Although many banks are active in the chemicals sector, including BNP Paribas, Citibank, KBC 
and Société Général, the only bank with a sector-specific chemicals policy so far is HSBC. 
HSBC will not provide facilities, advice or other forms of financial assistance, including any 
involvement in debt and equity market activities, to companies involved in the production of 
chemical weapons or the manufacture, storage and transport of persistent organic pollutants, or   
certain hazardous pesticides and industrial chemicals as defined in the Rotterdam Convention.179 
HSBC also states a preference to deal with customers that operate to international standards, 
including the Stockholm POPs Convention, the Rotterdam Convention, the WHO 
Recommended Classification of Pesticides by Hazards, and the Montreal Protocol. It also 
mentions it is “aware” of the REACH programme. 
 
HSBC should be commended for developing a chemicals policy, even though it addresses only 
those that are already strictly regulated by international law. Moreover, it is not clear how a 
policy that states a “preference” and an “awareness” will be implemented. It would be better to 
have clear requirements and a more general approach as outlined above. 
 
Those banks that have signed on to the Equator Principles would also have agreed generally to 
the assessment of environmental and social impacts, which would presumably include impacts 
from chemical releases. Such general assessment requirements, however, do not address other 
issues of chemical management, production or use. The IFC’s exclusion list excludes chemicals 
phased out through the Montreal Protocol and Stockholm POPs Convention, but it is not clear to 
what extent Equator Banks follow the IFC’s exclusion list.  
 
Ratings: 
 
2: HSBC 
0: BNP Paribas, Citibank, KBC, Société Général and all other banks 
 
Summary Chart of Chemical Sector Standards 
Standard Origin  Examples of Adoption 
Assessment of chemical 
impacts 
European REACH 
Precautionary principle 
OECD Guidelines, Equator 
Principles (for chemical 
releases) 
Waste minimisation and Basel Convention  
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pollution prevention 
Prohibition on production or 
consumption of restricted 
chemicals 
Montreal Protocol, Stockholm 
POPs, IAEA (Radiation) 
IFC Exclusion List. 
Prior informed consent for 
importing 
Rotterdam PIC Convention, 
Basel Convention 
 
Pesticide management and 
labelling 
FAO Pesticide Code, WHO  
Emergency planning and 
response plans 
OECD Guidelines  
Pollution emission standards PPAH  
Pollutant release and transfer 
reporting 
Aarhus Convention  
Chemical stockpile 
management 
Stockholm POPs  
Environmentally sound 
management of chemicals and 
waste 
SAICM; Basel Convention, 
Stockholm POPs 
 
Prohibition on chemical 
weapon manufacturing 
  
Occupational health and safety   
 
12. TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING BY CLIENTS 
A. Why a transparency and reporting policy is important 
People have a right to know about the impacts and risks of projects that may directly affect 
them, because disclosure of such information leads to more effective participation and better 
project decision-making.180 Unless affected people are fully apprised of an activity’s 
environmental, social and economic benefits, and its costs, risks and potential alternatives, they 
cannot hope to advance their interests. Access to project information is also necessary to ensure 
accountability – to hold project sponsors and their financial supporters to account for their 
activities, and to hold governments to account for how they respond to that conduct. 
 
Greater transparency also serves important interests of the client. It can, for example, help create 
a shared base of information on which various stakeholders can build trust and negotiate 
outcomes. Often, it is the absence of such a shared knowledge base, and the public perception 
that project sponsors are attempting to hide potential impacts, that leads to conflict and local 
opposition. Greater transparency can also reduce opportunities for corruption or for using  
revenues to build up military or other expenditure against the public interest.  
 
B. Best international standards 
The principle that the public has a right to information in order to participate meaningfully in 
environmental and social decision-making has been enshrined in several international 
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,181 the Rio Declaration,182 the  
Aarhus Convention183 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.184   
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C. Application to the banking sector  
Banks can play an important role in ensuring their clients disclose adequate information about 
environmental and social impacts. In addition to supporting the right of affected communities to 
participate meaningfully in project decision-making, transparency also serves the banks’ 
interests by ensuring that public concerns are raised and resolved before they become conflicts. 
Such concerns have led each of the multilateral development banks to adopt access to 
information policies, and many export credit agencies also provide substantial information 
regarding the environmental and social impacts of proposed projects. Commercial banks, too, 
should have clear policies regarding the environmental and social information their clients must 
disclose. 
 
For banks, a commitment to transparency requires at the very least a presumption of disclosure 
with respect to environmental and social information. This presumption itself requires a narrow 
interpretation of what information can be withheld under claims of business confidentiality. 
While confidentiality is a legitimate business concern, it should primarily protect material that 
could be advantageous to competitors, such as trade secrets or certain financial information.  
 
Very little information regarding environmental, social, health and safety impacts would meet 
this criterion. But even where it does, a client’s interest in confidentiality should not be 
overriding unless it outweighs the public’s right to know about impacts that may directly affect 
them. A bank’s decision to allow a client’s preference for secrecy to trump a community’s right 
to know is incompatible with an organisational commitment to conduct its business responsibly 
and sustainably. 
 
In addition to the presumption of disclosure, banks should also require the release of at least the 
following information in a timely and culturally appropriate manner: 
 
• Full draft and final environmental and social assessments for all transactions with 
significant impacts; 
• draft and final environmental and social management plans;  
• environmental and social covenants in financial documents (banks should disclose 
whether the client is fully covenanted to the environmental management plan (EMP), 
and whether any additional social and environmental covenants exist. This will allow 
communities to help hold the client accountable for environmental and social 
commitments); 
• any EMP compliance reports required from the client regarding commitments made in 
the EMP. Disclosure of these reports will improve public awareness of how the project 
sponsor is fulfilling its environmental and social obligations and help improve 
community participation in monitoring compliance;185 
• amounts and conditions of all material payments by borrowers to host governments and 
all material revenues received by governments from royalties, taxes, and concessions;186 
and  
• foreign investment contracts, including host government agreements, power purchase 
agreements and any other contracts between the company and the host government.187 
 
 
66 
 
 
 
D. Assessing bank performance  
None of the banks has specific policies that address transparency issues, although those that 
follow the Equator Principles have adopted minimal transparency requirements embedded in the 
underlying IFC safeguard policies. As part of the consultation requirements for Category A and 
some Category B projects, the Principles require banks to ensure that “the [Environmental 
Assessment], or a summary thereof, has been made available to the public for a reasonable minimum 
period in local language and in a culturally appropriate manner”. Beyond this limited requirement, 
the Equator Banks have refused to adopt the IFC’s or any other disclosure policy. For having at 
least some (albeit limited) requirements for disclosure of environmental assessments, the 
Equator Banks receive a (2) in our rating system. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Lack of transparency in the commercial banking sector remains a critical issue, and one in 
which the private sector banks are lagging behind their public sector counterparts, the 
multilateral development banks and export credit agencies. Developing a specific disclosure 
policy which sets out the requirements for disclosure for their clients is urgently needed.  
 
Ratings: 
 
(2): Equator Principle Banks 
(0): All other banks 
 
Summary Chart for Transparency and Reporting Standards 
Standard Origin Examples of Adoption 
Draft and final environmental 
and social assessments 
Aarhus World Bank Group 
Draft and final Environmental 
management plans 
Aarhus IFC Draft Performance 
Standards (Final Action 
Plans) 
Environmental and social loan 
covenants 
 IBRD/IDA 
Material payments and 
royalties 
EITI IFC Draft Performance 
Standards (limited) 
Foreign investment contracts EIR IFC Draft Performance 
Standards (limited) 
 
 
13. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
A. Why a policy on environmental and social management is important 
Establishing an effective management system is perhaps the most important challenge of 
addressing environmental and social risks and impacts for all corporations. The environmental 
and social (E&S) management system is the institutional and policy basis for implementing all 
other policies. Some elements of a comprehensive and effective E&S management system must 
be reflected in policies, but other elements reflect institutional structures or operations that 
extend beyond what can be put in a written policy. The policy is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
step for implementing a strong management system. 
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B. Best international standards 
Elements of an effective E&S management system have been identified in a number of 
international instruments and multi-stakeholder processes, including the OECD Multinational 
Enterprise Guidelines and the World Commission on Dams.188 The International Standards 
Organisation has also developed ISO 14001, the commonly-used standard for environmental 
management systems (ISO 14001). 
 
The following principles, derived from international best standards, should animate and guide 
the development of an E&S management system:   
 
1. Adoption of a rights-based approach. The E&S management system should reflect a rights-
based approach to environmental and social issues, including economic, social, cultural, 
political and civil rights as covered in UN conventions, as well as the rights of workers and 
indigenous people.189  
 
2. Adoption of a precautionary approach. Precaution is now a well-established principle of 
environmental governance: it is prominent in numerous law, policy and management 
instruments at national and international levels.190 According to the Rio Declaration, the 
Precautionary Principle requires that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.191 This means that banks should avoid funding 
projects that have the potential for disproportionate and irreversible impacts, at least until more 
certainty regarding those impacts can be achieved. And where the project may have less severe 
but still uncertain impacts, the bank should treat the project as if it falls into the higher category 
of risk and impacts. 
 
3. Exclusion of harmful activities. A bank’s refusal to support activities with unacceptable 
impacts is critical to improving the overall sustainability of its portfolio. Banks should be 
upfront and clear about the types of activities that do not meet their minimum expectations for 
sustainability, and inform their stakeholders of these threshold requirements by means of an 
exclusion list. Banks should initially adopt the IFC’s Exclusion List and supplement it with 
other types of projects that fail to meet international standards and best practice. This expanded 
list should include, for example, projects in or impacting upon World Heritage Sites, IUCN I-IV 
areas, critical habitats for species on the IUCN Red list, and recognised Marine Protected Areas; 
projects involving the use or production of persistent organic pollutants; riverine or shallow 
submarine tailings disposals for mining wastes; aquaculture that converts coastal mangrove 
areas; and projects that harm significant coral reef systems. A complete list of projects that 
should be excluded in the initial bank screening is provided in Annex 4. 
 
4. Ensuring a participatory decision-making process. Banks should establish clear requirements 
and benchmarks for an informed and participatory decision-making process by their clients. 
This should include requiring the client to release the information identified in the transparency 
policy (see Part II.12. above). Affected communities should have the right to be fully informed 
from the early stages of project development, and to participate freely and safely throughout all 
stages of development. Timelines should allow for local involvement and community input.  
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Those consulted should include all members of society – not least those often marginalised such 
as indigenous people, women and the elderly. Finally, public acceptance of key decisions is 
essential. The project should not proceed without the demonstrable agreement of affected 
people, and the free, prior and informed consent of affected indigenous people.192  Any decision 
to change the project must require additional consultation with, and acceptance by, the affected 
community. As part of the bank’s due diligence, it should independently verify the adequacy 
and completeness of the participation process and of the community’s consent.   
 
In later stages, affected communities should be integrated into the monitoring system by being 
provided with copies of all monitoring reports and by being solicited for their input and 
information.  
 
5. Benefit sharing. The concept of fairness and benefit sharing is recognised in many 
international norms, including the World Commission on Dams guidelines and the Aarhus 
Convention, and should be embedded in a bank’s E&S management system. As part of its due 
diligence, the bank should ensure that the project provides appropriate benefits to any affected 
local communities. Agreements between the company and those communities should be 
provided to the bank and covenanted to loan agreements. The bank should make clear that 
material violations of the agreement by the client will be considered a default of the financial 
agreement with the bank. 
 
6. Fostering sustainability and continuous improvement. A key element of an ISO 14001-certified 
environmental management system is the commitment to “continuous improvement.” Moving 
the portfolio towards environmentally and socially sustainable practices and projects is 
fundamental. Banks must proactively support sustainable practices that improve environmental 
and social conditions, including for example, shifting energy investments away from fossil fuels 
to renewables; the capitalisation of sustainable enterprises; programmes for discounting loans 
for energy reduction; investments in independently certified sustainable forestry, agriculture, 
fishing or similar resource- or commodity-related activities; and clean technology investment 
funds.  
 
7. Exercising leadership in the sphere of influence.  International business organisations, from the 
World Business Council on Sustainable Development to Business for Social Responsibility, 
recognise that the notion of corporate social responsibility extends throughout a firm’s sphere of 
influence beyond the activities and operations of the company itself to its suppliers and clients. 
Thus banks should, and should require their clients to, require effective environmental and 
social management from their suppliers. They should also exercise independent due diligence to 
ensure that inputs purchased or received from others do not violate their own environmental and 
social policies is a necessary principle for sustainability.  
 
Banks committed to sustainable finance must also exercise leadership in the sector and in 
society generally. In addition, they must assert their leadership through the syndications or 
arrangements with other banks that have yet to join the sustainable finance movement. This will 
be increasingly important over time as banks from China or other developing countries that have 
little experience of sustainable finance become increasingly important players on the 
international stage.  Finally, to be recognised leaders in sustainable finance the banks must also 
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ensure that they do not use their political influence to circumvent or undermine the development 
of regulatory and other approaches to sustainable development.193 
 
C. Application to the banking sector 
Like all corporations concerned with sustainability, banks must have their own management 
system in place, based on the elements identified above, to provide a basis for a strong bank-
wide sustainability programme. They must also exercise their own due diligence to ensure their 
clients have adopted E&S management systems that include these basic elements. In this way, 
banks can gain confidence that the policy commitments of their clients (and  the commitments 
they have made in their financial covenants with the banks) are more likely to be effectively 
implemented.  
 
The following is a list of 10 common elements of a comprehensive E&S management system: 
 
1 An initial environmental and social review to determine key environmental and social 
exposures, impacts and risks; 
2 an environmental and social policy that sets the bank’s overall approach and issue-
specific policies to address its portfolio; 
3 annual action plans; 
4 committed organisational structure which includes staffing, oversight and compensation 
matters; 
5 environmental and social procedures and standards for transactions, including deal-level 
transparency, consultation and compliance procedures; 
6 documentation, including that required to facilitate implementation audits; 
7 internal information and training; 
8 external reporting, verification and consultation; 
9 compliance monitoring of the E&S management system and corrective action; and 
10 management review and improvement (feeding back into the cycle and informing 
annual action plans). 
 
Simply having each of the 10 components in an E&S management system is not enough to 
ensure sustainability; the following are some strong characteristics of a Management System:  
 
1. Independence.  Independence is a key characteristic that should inform various aspects of an 
E&S management system. For example, while environmental assessment is primarily the 
responsibility of the client, banks have a parallel responsibility independently to assess the 
adequacy of the client’s environmental and social due diligence. Similarly, an effective 
monitoring system for projects requires information to be provided regularly and reported by an 
independent third party. 
  
2. Independence, rigorous accountability and compliance oversight. The efficacy of any E&S 
management system rests on compliance and implementation and thus on establishing a 
comprehensive compliance mechanism, both for transactions and the bank’s overall E&S 
management system. Banks should therefore adopt, and require their clients to adopt, 
mechanisms that ensure effective compliance for transactions. This means establishing 
independent mechanisms for ensuring that their policies are well implemented, that important 
environmental and social conditions of investments are being met, and that the activities they 
finance are not causing significant adverse impacts. This should include internal audit systems 
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and corrective protocols, and independent grievance mechanisms that enable affected people to 
raise compliance concerns.   
 
In addition, there must be annual reviews of the E&S management system itself to identify and 
correct problems and enable organisational learning and continuous improvement. This might 
include opportunities to establish annual goals, expand board-level oversight, and ensure 
appropriate levels of staffing and responsibility. 
 
3.  Comprehensive understanding of sustainability impacts. Banks must understand their own 
sustainability impacts on the transaction, as well as at the portfolio level. For example, 
comprehensive environmental and social assessment is the baseline for virtually all other steps 
in implementing sustainability. At a minimum, every assessment must include provision of 
baseline data, assessment of all impacts including cumulative, transboundary and indirect 
impacts, a full options assessment and evaluation of all alternatives, including those with lesser 
environmental and social risks.  Related to this, banks will also need to begin measuring the 
environmental and social impacts of their portfolio in all of their core business areas. 
 
4. Creating a culture of sustainability. Banks should strive to create a culture of sustainability.  
For example, they should develop a systematic approach to training and rewarding employees, 
so that over time the company reinforces a strong management culture of sustainability. Each 
bank should, and should require its clients to, develop and implement an effective training 
programme for relevant staff. Staff incentives should be adjusted to ensure rewards for decisions 
that promote environmental and social sustainability, even if that means that some financially 
attractive opportunities are delayed or dropped 
 
D. Assessing  bank performance  
The Equator Banks have adopted an initial framework for an environmental and social 
management system. The Principles and the underlying IFC safeguard policies require banks to 
screen projects and categorise them according to their environmental and social risk. The clients 
are also required to provide environmental assessments that address to the bank’s satisfaction 
any adverse environmental and social issues. For projects with significant adverse impacts, 
clients will be required to consult affected communities, develop an environmental management 
plan, and report regularly on compliance with the plan.  
 
The Equator Principles are relatively vague and general. They apply only to project finance 
where the total capital cost exceeds US$50 million. More generally, the Principles emphasise 
assessment and mitigation of harm, rather than an integrated proactive approach to 
sustainability. For this reason, an environmental and social management system based only on 
the Equator Principles warrants a (1). 
Unfortunately, we could not determine to what extent the various banks have developed E&S 
management systems beyond what is reflected in the Equator Principles. Many elements of the 
banks’ internal E&S management systems were impossible to evaluate, given the lack of 
information about implementation. We have anecdotal evidence that some banks have 
implemented significant portions of an effective E&S management system, but we are unable to 
rate them either individually or collectively. The need for greater transparency with respect to 
implementation is discussed further in Part IV. 
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Many banks claim a leadership role in sustainability, but actual leadership is hard to discern. 
This report has identified some examples of banks taking a proactive leadership role in 
sustainability – for example HSBC’s role in achieving carbon neutrality and Rabobank’s role in 
supporting the Responsible Commodities Initiative. These and other examples are set out in 
previous sections. 
 
Rating 
 
(1): Equator Principle Banks 
(0): Other banks 
 
Summary Chart of Standards on Environmental & Social Management Systems 
Standard Origin Examples of Adoption 
Require E&S assessment   Equator Principles 
Independence: Independent 
review of assessments 
 Equator Principles 
Exclusions list Various international 
instruments 
IFC; OPIC 
Requiring participatory 
decision-making  
Aarhus Convention Equator Principles (limited) 
Ensuring community benefits   
Culture of Sustainability: 
Training and rewarding staff 
 Unclear from information 
available. 
Rigorous Accountability: 
Ensuring internal compliance 
monitoring  
 Unclear from information 
available. 
Rigorous Accountability: 
Establishing external 
accountability or dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
 World Bank; EBRD; AsDB; 
IDB; IFC; Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation; 
OPIC; Export Development 
Canada  
Sphere of Influence: 
Requiring clients and 
suppliers to have an E&S 
management system with the 
above elements 
 Equator Principles (limited) 
 
 
III. OVERALL POLICY FINDINGS  
A. The banking sector’s environmental and social policies 
As this review demonstrates, a growing number of banks are developing sector-specific policies 
that apply to transactions. Some policies were developed prior to the Equator Principles, while 
others were developed in part as a response to the Principles and thus reflect the Principles’ 
inherent limitations. The increasing development, scope and diversity of policies is welcome 
and provides significant promise for stronger policy frameworks in the future.  
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As our analysis indicates, with few exceptions bank policies are lagging significantly behind 
relevant international standards and best practices. Table 1 provides a summary of all ratings for 
each bank across each of the 13 policies analysed. The average numerical grades can be 
translated into a letter grade according to the following scale: 
 
0.00 to 0.50 E  2.26 to 2.50 C+ 
0.51 to 0.75 D-  2.51 to 2.75 B- 
0.76 to 1.25 D  2.76 to 3.25 B 
1.26 to 1.50 D+  3.26 to 3.50 B+ 
1.51 to 1.75 C-  3.51 to 3.75 A- 
1.76 to 2.25 C   3.76 to 4.00 A 
 
The highest overall average score, achieved by ABN AMRO and HSBC Group, was a 1.31, 
which if translated to a letter grade is a D+.  
 
Banks that have adopted the Equator Principles, but have not supplemented the Principles with 
other policies, received a score of only 0.46 (E). Moreover, even where banks have adopted 
specific policies, they are frequently vague and aspirational. And in only two cases – 
Rabobank’s adoption of the UN Draft Norms on Human Rights and HSBC’s adoption of the 
World Commission on Dams standards – has any bank adopted policies that meet most or all  of 
the relevant international standards or best practices. 
 
Table 1:  Summary of Policy Ratings 
Bank 
H
u
m
a
n
  
rig
h
ts 
L
a
b
o
u
r 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
p
eo
p
le 
C
lim
a
te
 a
n
d
 
en
e
r g
y
 
D
a
m
s 
B
io
d
iv
ersity
 
F
o
r
ests 
F
ish
e
ries 
A
g
ric
u
ltu
re 
E
x
tra
c
tiv
e 
In
d
u
stries 
C
h
e
m
ica
ls 
T
ra
n
sp
a
re
n
cy
 
E
&
S
  
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
A
v
e
ra
g
e S
co
r
e a
n
d
 
L
etter
 G
ra
d
e 
ABN AMRO  3 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 0 2 0 2 1 1.31 (D+) 
Banco Bradesco  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Banco de Brasil 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54  (D-) 
Banco Itaú  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Barclays  1 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0.77  (D) 
BBVA  0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
BNDES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (E) 
BNP Paribas  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
Bank of 
America  
0 0 1 3 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.85 (D) 
Calyon  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
CIBC  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Citigroup  0 3 1 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1.00 (D) 
Credit Suisse 
Group  
0 1 1  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
Deutsche Bank  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
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Dexia  0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
Dresdner Bank  0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
HBOS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
HSBC Group  0 1 1 1 4 2 3 0 0 0 2 2 1 1.31 (D+) 
HVB Group 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
ING Group  1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.62 (D-) 
JP Morgan 
Chase 
0 1 3 3 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 2 1 1.23 (D) 
KBC  0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (E) 
Korean Dev. 
Bank  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (E) 
Manulife  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
MCC  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi  
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
Mizuho 
Financial Group  
0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Rabobank 
Group  
4 3 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1.15 (D) 
Royal Bank of 
Canada 
0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland  
0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-)  
Scotia Bank  0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-)  
Société Général  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 (E) 
Standard 
Chartered Bank  
1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.54 (D-) 
Sumitomo 
Mitsui Financial 
Group 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (E) 
UBS  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 (E) 
Unibanco  0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E)  
Wells Fargo 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E) 
West LB 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.46 (E)  
Westpac 3 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.77 (D-) 
 
Generally speaking, the Asian banks scored low, as did the French banks. Specific policies have 
been adopted by at least one bank in 10 of the 13 categories, the only exceptions being fisheries, 
agriculture and transparency. ABN AMRO scored points in the most categories (9 of 13). 
Seventeen have labour-related policies (including 15 that have adopted the Global Compact). 
Eight banks have adopted human rights policies, and eight have specific climate change 
policies. Seven have specific forest policies, five have policies relating to indigenous people and 
three have policies on biodiversity. Only one bank has a policy specifically for dams (HSBC), 
extractives (ABN AMRO) and chemicals (HSBC). 
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B. Moving beyond project finance to bank-wide policies 
Many of the banks considered in this study only apply their environmental and social policies to 
traditional project finance transactions. This includes those banks that have adopted, but not 
gone beyond, the Equator Principles. Project finance is an obvious starting point for a bank to 
improve the environmental and social sustainability of its portfolio. But it is only a starting 
point: sustainable financing ultimately requires attention to the environmental and social 
impacts of all financial operations. Many other types of client support can have substantial 
environmental and social impacts. At the end of the day, the scale of the impact, not the nature 
or size of the transaction, should dictate whether a policy response is appropriate. Moreover, 
from the banks’ perspective, other financial products may also entail significant financial, credit 
and reputational risks associated with environmental and social performance. Ultimately, then, 
banks should have E&S policies and management systems that are tailored to the imperatives 
and impacts of the full range of their operations.  
 
It is true that policy-based responses may well be more difficult to develop and apply to some 
investment and financing arrangements than to others. Still, there are a number of clear 
opportunities to expand E&S policies beyond the narrow parameters currently applied by many 
of the banks.  
 
First, current policies should be applied fully to all project finance deals. Thus, for the Equator 
Banks, the US$50 million threshold should be abandoned. It is arbitrary and does not 
adequately reflect that projects of less than US$50 million can cause substantial or irreparable 
harm, especially in developing countries. Some banks assessed in this report have already begun 
to apply at least some E&S policies to smaller-scale projects. For example, several Equator 
Banks – such as ABN-AMRO, Banco-Itau, Barclays, HSBC, HVB, JPMorganChase, KBC, 
Mizuho, RBC, Unibanco and Westpac – have agreed to apply their policies to projects below 
the Equator Principles’ US$50 million threshold. Some banks, such as ABN AMRO, apply the 
Principles to all projects while others, such as JPMorganChase, have lowered the threshold to 
US$10 million for projects in certain environmentally sensitive sectors. Still others, such as 
HSBC and Barclays, apply the Principles to projects below US$50 million on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
Second, and of more importance, banks should apply their policies to all kinds of project-related 
support, including arranging, advisory services, equity interests, export finance, corporate loans 
and insurance.194 Some banks, including ABN-AMRO, Barclays, Citigroup, HSBC, HVB, 
JPMorganChase,  KBC, Mizuho, Standard Chartered, Unibanco and West LB, have begun to 
apply the Principles to a wider range of services. For example, HSBC applies its basic policy to 
“project advisory roles, corporate lending where the end use of proceeds is for a project, and to 
other forms of financial assistance such as bonding and guarantees directly linked to projects”. 
Similarly, Citigroup applies a policy derived from the Principles to corporate loans and debt 
securities underwriting where the specific use of proceeds is known. JPMorganChase applies its 
basic environmental and social policy to all loans, debt and equity underwriting, financial 
advisories and project-linked derivative transactions where the use of proceeds is designated for 
potentially damaging projects. 
 
Third, banks should develop policy-based analysis to address the environmental and social risks 
of other types of transactions. These policies should ensure that the appropriate level of due 
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diligence, stakeholder consultation and assessment is conducted, based on the particular risks of 
the transaction.195 For example, client assessment tools and sector-specific policies should be 
adopted for corporate loans or bond issues for companies that operate in high-risk sectors such 
as forestry, extractive industries, chemicals or dams.196 To this end, HSBC has developed sector 
guidelines for those industries it considers to have potentially high environmental and social 
risks. HSBC’s forests and chemicals policies apply to all facilities and other forms of client 
assistance, including any involvement in debt and equity markets activities and advisory roles. 
ABN AMRO and BBVA have developed diagnostic tools to evaluate the extent to which clients 
in certain sectors apply sound environmental and social risk management practices, regardless 
of what type of assistance the client is seeking. 
 
C. Conclusions  
The environmental and social policies described in this report provide a comprehensive 
framework for promoting sustainability at commercial banks. Proposed standards go far beyond 
the IFC framework that underlies the Equator Principles, both in terms of existing and proposed 
standards. Bank policies should reflect the international standards laid out in this report and 
should be updated regularly to keep pace with evolving international norms. Every bank must 
prioritise the establishment of its own policies to reflect its specific portfolios. Not every bank 
will need to develop a policy reflecting best practice for investments in extractives or agriculture 
– for example, if they do not provide financial support for these sectors.  
 
Finally, the revision of the IFC’s safeguard policy framework provides a significant opportunity 
to address the gaps and weaknesses in the current Equator Principles. Unfortunately, only a 
small minority of Equator Banks have taken steps to adopt additional standards, and only in rare 
instances have banks adopted supplemental policies that meet international norms and best 
practice. Before adopting the IFC’s new Performance Standards system, the Equator Banks 
should carefully compare its provisions with the international standards and best practice set 
forth in this report, and augment the IFC’s system with whatever additional policies are 
necessary to meet these requirements. 
 
IV. ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION BY THE BANKING SECTOR 
While it is important to evaluate the substance of the environmental and social policies of these 
banks, it is far more important to assess their consequences. All stakeholders agree that the true 
test of these policies is how they affect operations in the real world – that is, how the banks are 
implementing them in practice. 
 
Unfortunately, given the near total lack of publicly available information on implementation, it 
is all but impossible to make qualitative judgments about how the banks are performing in terms 
of implementing their E&S management systems. While some banks do report limited amounts 
of aggregated information about the application of their policies, none provides adequate 
information to allow outside observers to evaluate how effectively they are implementing their 
environmental and social commitments. This is a major failing in the current approach of all the 
banks; without such transparency, even the more progressive banks leave themselves vulnerable 
to charges of “greenwash”. 
 
Because information about systems or practices for implementation is not routinely disclosed, 
the public can only assess performance based on sparse anecdotal evidence. Thus, on the one 
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hand, we know that many banks have made significant efforts to implement their policies in 
good faith. But on the other hand, we also know that even banks with relatively strong policies 
are still supporting high profile projects that have unacceptable environmental or social impacts. 
In the absence of any evidence of how the policies are routinely applied, it is impossible to 
discern whether this disconnection between the requirements of the policies and the way that 
they are sometimes implemented is aberrational or standard operating procedure. As a result, a 
sceptical public is likely to judge banks’ performance on the basis of their least admirable 
projects. Over time, this can only erode the credibility of all banks committed to sustainable 
finance. 
 
To ensure better implementation and to instill confidence in external stakeholders, banks need to 
address two main issues related to their E&S management systems: increased transparency in 
reporting on their implementation, and adoption of a strong compliance monitoring and 
accountability system. 
 
A. Transparency of implementation 
In order for outside stakeholders to be confident that the banking sector’s policy 
pronouncements are more than just rhetoric, banks should urgently adopt a reporting framework 
that shows – rather than merely suggests – that they are implementing their policies in ways that 
make a meaningful difference to people and the planet. We suggest that banks issue annual 
sustainability reports in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative, particularly the 
emerging Financial Services Sector Supplement. This reporting format is presently in draft form 
but as it is finalised, and as technical protocols and implementation guides are developed, it will 
provide a comprehensive reporting framework for banks and stakeholders alike. 
 
The outlines of this disclosure framework can be sketched in advance of the GRI completing its 
work. At the corporate level, this would include reporting on the performance and sustainability 
impact of its financial decisions through an annual sustainability report. Such a report would 
include the number of projects rejected on environmental and social concerns, information 
about loans suspended or called in due to non-compliance with environmental and social 
requirements, a breakdown of core business activities by sector and region, and an assessment 
of implementation of E&S policies and management systems. Banks should disclose 
information about project transactions and the categorisation of projects, and require the client 
to disclose draft and final assessments as well as management/action plans. 
 
Given that the banks offer varying levels of information on implementation, we recommend that 
they adopt a standardised approach (through the GRI or otherwise) by describing the following 
in their annual sustainability report: 
• The scope and scale of their business to which their environmental and social policies 
apply;  
• internal guidelines and processes for developing and applying the policies; 
• internal structures and processes for assessing the environmental and social impacts of 
proposed project transactions, including a description of the level of management that is 
responsible for compliance, and the internal lines of reporting and accountability; 
• the process for evaluating the client’s past record, commitment to sustainability, and 
capacity for addressing the expected impacts; 
• actions taken to ensure that staff, procedure and internal control structures have capacity 
to implement the E&S management system, including specifically budget information 
and information about staff training programmes; 
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• mechanisms to ensure an independent, comprehensive and substantive review of all 
technical documents, including assessments and management/action plans, as well as 
the adequacy of public consultation and acceptance in the project development process; 
• systems for determining the borrower’s compliance with the management/action plan, 
including the reporting process relating to loan covenants, and the approach to taking 
corrective action; and 
• specific instances of material non-compliance with the EMP, including the nature of the 
non-compliance, action taken to rectify it, whether that action has been successful and, 
if not, what further action (including the calling-in of loans) has been taken. 197   
 
B. Compliance and accountability of bank operations 
Implementation will require a robust system for resolving disputes and ensuring compliance. In 
addition to requiring their clients to adopt independent, objective and responsive grievance 
mechanisms at the project level (as discussed in the section on Environmental and Social 
Management Systems), the banks must establish a system for ensuring that their policies are 
implemented on the ground, that important environmental and social conditions of investments 
are being met, that the activities they finance are not causing significant adverse impacts, and 
that the banks have a mechanism for hearing concerns from affected communities unfiltered 
through their clients. Such a mechanism should include at least three elements: 
 
1. INTERNAL COMPLIANCE SYSTEM. A compliance system should include an 
independent audit function to ensure that the bank and its clients are complying with the 
standards. It should also include clear provisions that the management plan, including the 
negotiated settlement agreement between the client and the community, is a covenanted part of 
the loan agreement.  
 
2. INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM.
198
 The banking sector needs a 
mechanism to ensure that its activities, and the activities it supports financially, can be held 
accountable by people who are affected. Such people need a forum where they can raise their 
concerns over policy implementation and the impacts of the resulting project or activities.  
 
Such accountability mechanisms now exist at many international financial institutions including 
the World Bank (IDA/IBRD), the IFC and MIGA, regional development banks for Europe, Asia 
and the Americas, and export credit or risk insurance agencies in Canada, Japan and the United 
States. Although they vary, each mechanisms is designed to ensure compliance with E&S 
policies by allowing the concerns of affected people to be heard at the highest management 
levels. Some mechanisms (including, for example the IFC/MIGA’s Compliance Adviser and 
Ombudsman) also try to use the leverage of the financial institution to help project-affected 
people resolve their concerns.  
 
To meet the standards set by the mechanisms at the international financial institutions, the 
commercial banks should ensure that any accountability mechanism they create meets the 
following criteria: 
 
• The process must be independent of bank financial operations; 
• it must be transparent and include publication of all compliance reports and other 
findings; 
• it must at the very least be accessible to project-affected communities and their 
representatives; and 
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• it must have the resources and authority to be fair, objective, responsive and effective in 
reviewing project compliance and in responding to the concerns of the affected 
community. 
 
3. ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM. The banks should ensure that their environmental and social 
commitments are reflected in legally binding agreements by all clients as material aspects of the 
underlying financial agreements. Banks should not enter into any agreement with a client if they 
do not agree to meet the conditions of the bank’s environmental and social policies and all the 
terms of the E&S management plan, which should be included as a legally binding covenant in 
the agreement. Violations of this agreement should be grounds for default and termination of the 
contract if unresolved.  
 
It is of crucial importance that the enforcement of environmental and social conditions in the 
financial agreements should involve locally affected people. The banks should establish 
mechanisms, included in the financial agreement, that provide for the participation of affected 
people. The banks should identify a process (for example, an ombudsman) for receiving 
information from locally affected people about material violations of the financial agreements. 
That information should be considered by the bank in enforcing the loan conditions. In addition, 
affected people should be able to bring third-party complaints regarding the behaviour of either 
the bank or its clients under the dispute resolution procedures of the financial agreement.  
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Box 7:  Equator Principle Banks and Accountability 
 
Without doubt, there are different types of Equator Banks – the leaders and the laggards. Too 
many banks have adopted the Equator Principles without a commitment to putting them into 
practice, establishing a management system or developing their own policies. This problem 
must be addressed urgently because the credibility and value of the Equator Principle Initiative 
is at risk. We recommend that banks be given two years to meet the spirit and expectations of 
the Principles, after which their membership should be revoked. Measurements for evaluating 
effective adoption of the Principles should be developed jointly and include NGOs, and require 
transparent reporting on implementation. 
 
Because of the joint nature of the commitment to the Principles, the Equator Banks should agree 
to take a coordinated approach to accountability in order to ensure greater adherence to their 
joint commitments and to improve implementation for affected people. The Equator Banks 
could establish a joint accountability mechanism, independent of any one bank. This could be 
funded collectively through a revolving fund which reflects each Equator Bank’s size. Having 
only one mechanism would reduce confusion and be more easily understood by project-affected 
people. A joint mechanism would also be less costly, promote clear, coherent and consistent 
application of the Equator Principles and be perceived as more independent and objective than 
mechanisms beholden to any one bank. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS    
There have been welcome improvements in recent years, with banks recognising the need to 
develop increasingly stronger and comprehensive environmental and social policies. So far, the 
approach has been somewhat ad hoc and limited to a relatively small number of banks. A larger 
number of banks have adopted the Equator Principles and linked themselves with IFC safeguard 
policies, but it is unclear how many of these banks are taking the requirements at all seriously. 
 
However, the absence of any systematic and credible way to monitor implementation efforts 
from the outside is a critical conclusion of this report. Annual sustainability reports are varied 
and not necessarily objective in their presentation of the banks’ efforts. Other information 
available to the public – particularly the participation of various banks in environmentally and 
socially suspect projects – raises serious concerns over implementation. ABN AMRO’s 
agreement to support the Sakhalin II oil and gas project is just the latest in a series of problem 
projects. 
 
Even those banks that have announced quite detailed policies are keeping the details of 
implementation to themselves. We know from personal discussions or through the grapevine 
that some banks have begun to implement serious environmental and social risk management 
systems, but there is no way to evaluate these systems from the outside. As we have moved 
from a “tell me” to a “show me” and “prove it” world, this is not good enough for the banks to 
carry the mantle of sustainability. 
 
The advent of the Equator Principles was a welcome first step in the discussion – but only a first 
step. The Principles do not provide an adequate policy basis for E&S risk management, as 
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evidenced by the welcome adoption of more detailed policies by individual banks and by the 
broad revisions being undertaken by the IFC to the policies that underlie the Principles. 
 
As the Equator Banks prepare for and respond to the IFC’s new standards, they should update 
and revise their overall framework to reflect the elements of an E&S management system noted 
above, including establishing an internal compliance system, a shared external accountability 
mechanism, clearer requirements for informed and participatory consultation, including benefit 
sharing and negotiated settlements for communities and a transparency and disclosure policy 
identifying both what is required of the banks and their clients to disclose. The banks should 
abolish the arbitrary US$50 million level and a robust, policy-based environmental and social 
risk management system should be applied to all financial transactions, depending on the nature 
of the impact. 
 
As the IFC finalises and adopts its new Performance Standards system, the banking sector 
should address weaknesses and gaps in this new approach. Banks should continue to develop 
their own policies which reflect their own priorities and practices in the area of sustainable 
development. Individual bank policies should be based on international best practice, including 
(but not limited to) what is reflected in the IFC’s Performance Standards. Deficiencies in the 
IFC approach are already apparent – for example with respect to human rights, climate change, 
biodiversity protection and illegal logging.  
 
More transparency and dialogue with civil society will be important if those banks committed to 
environmental and social risk management are to distance themselves from others in the 
industry who are not so committed. Not only have some banks signed on to the Equator 
Principles with little or no additional change in their policies or practice, but many banks, 
particularly in developing countries such as China, India and Malaysia, are emerging as major 
players in developing country finance. They have yet to express any commitment to 
environmental and social sustainability, and there is an increasing risk that they will bottom-
feed on those projects and transactions that would not otherwise receive support from any banks 
with even minimal environmental and social sustainability criteria. Industry leaders must use 
their influence, through syndicates and the interlocking ownership found in the industry, to 
ensure that the entire banking sector begins to reflect sustainability policies and practice. 
 
In conclusion,  while some industry leaders have begun to infuse their operations with broad-
based commitments to sustainability, they still have far to go to meet international standards 
and best practices – as does the rest of the industry. If it is to serve as a  reliable, effective and 
profitable catalyst for sustainable development, the financial industry must not only adopt 
strong and comprehensive policies, but it must also put into place comprehensive risk 
management systems that ensure rigorous implementation of the policies. Present policy 
development is still too embryonic, and information about implementation too guarded, for us 
to determine whether the banking industry has crossed the threshold into a promising new era 
of green finance – or merely refined the discredited old tools of greenwash. 
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ANNEX I:  TOP BANKS RANKED BY VOLUME OF PROJECT FINANCE AND TIER 
ONE CAPITAL 
Top Ten Project Finance Banks 2004 
 
 
Bank 
Equator/Non-Equator Bank 
 
Volume of Projects  
(US$ billions) 
BNP Paribas 
 
Non-Equator Bank 5.1 
Citigroup 
 
Equator Bank 4.8 
Barclays 
 
Equator Bank 4.7 
Royal Bank of Scotland Equator Bank 4.1 
Credit Suisse 
 
Equator Bank 3.6 
Société Général Non-Equator Bank 3.5 
Korea Development Bank Non-Equator Bank 3.1 
Calyon 
 
Equator Bank 2.9 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Group 
Non-Equator Bank 2.8 
ABN AMRO 
 
Equator Bank 2.6 
Source: Dealogic 
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Top 12 Tier One Capital 
 
 
BANK 
 
 
COUNTRY 
US$MILLIONS 
2004 
RANK: 
2004 
RANK: 
2003 
RANK: 
 2002 
CITIGROUP USA 66,871 1 1 1 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
GROUPE 
FRANCE 55,435 2 5 7 
HSBC 
HOLDINGS 
UK 54,863 3 3 5 
BANK OF 
AMERICA 
CORP 
USA 44,050 4 2* 2* 
JP MORGAN 
CHASE 
USA 43,167 5 4* 4* 
MIZUHO 
FINANCIAL 
GROUP 
JAPAN 37,786 6 6 3 
MITSUBISHI 
TOKYO 
FINANCIAL 
GROUP 
JAPAN 37,003 7 N/A N/A 
ROYAL 
BANK OF 
SCOTLAND 
UK 34,623 8 7 13 
SUMITOMO 
MITSUI 
FINANCIAL 
GROUP 
JAPAN 34,244 9 8 6 
BNP 
PARIBAS 
FRANCE 32,458 10 10 15 
HBOS UK 29,349 11 12 19 
DEUTSCHE 
BANK 
GERMANY 27,303 12 12 12 
 Source: The Banker 
 * pre-merger 
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ANNEX 2:  THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES AND IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
In 2003, 10 of the largest commercial banks in the world agreed to the so-called Equator 
Principles – a common set of policies for financial institutions to determine, assess and manage 
environmental and social risks in project finance. By the end of 2005, 37 of the world’s largest 
private financial institutions had signed on to the Principles.  
 
The Principles set out an overall framework for banks to review and evaluate environmental and 
social impacts and risks, to reduce and mitigate those risks, and to ensure that the borrower is 
meeting the terms of the agreement. The Equator Principles’ overall framework is based on the 
environmental and social Safeguard Policies,199 pollution standards200 and environmental and 
social risk categorisation system of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) – the private 
sector arm of the World Bank Group.  Signatories to the Principles are also expected to adopt 
their own internal policies, procedures and management systems for implementing the 
framework.   
 
The centrepiece of the Equator Principles approach is its environmental assessment 
requirements. Projects are classified as Category A, B or C (high, medium or low environmental 
or social risk). For all Category A and Category B projects, a borrower must carry out an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA), which addresses the environmental and social issues 
identified in the categorisation process. 
 
The EIA must demonstrate that the project complies with host country laws, regulations 
applicable to the project, and World Bank Group Pollution Guidelines for the relevant industry 
sector. For projects in low and middle income countries (listed in a World Bank database), the 
EIA must also address the relevant Safeguard Policy, including issues such as natural habitats, 
indigenous people, involuntary resettlement, forestry and cultural property. 
 
For all Category A and some Category B projects, the borrower or a third party expert must 
prepare an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) which addresses mitigation and monitoring 
of environmental and social impacts. For these projects, the bank must be satisfied that the 
borrower has carried out a public consultation process among groups affected by the project. 
The terms of the EMP will be covenanted, and the bank will work with the borrower to ensure 
compliance.   
 
The content of the Equator Principles is expected to be substantially revised to account for 
revisions in the IFC’s policy framework. In 2004, the IFC began overhauling its environmental 
and social policies and procedures. This revision process was shaped in part by a review by the 
IFC’s Compliance Adviser/Ombudsman (CAO), which criticised the IFC for falling behind best 
practice in some areas, particularly in addressing social impacts.   
 
The CAO report also called for significant improvements in internal IFC procedures for 
compliance, oversight and supervision of projects, and challenged the IFC to review more 
effectively the capacity and commitment of its clients in meeting environmental and social 
standards.  
 
The IFC’s proposed policies introduce eight new “Performance Standards” applicable to the 
client, and an environmental and social policy applicable to IFC staff. The latest publicly 
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available draft (December 2005) is controversial for failing to articulate clear minimum 
standards of client performance, introducing substantial degrees of discretion for IFC approval 
of projects, refusing to reflect international legal standards and, in some instances, weakening 
existing policies. 
 
The IFC is expected to finalise its new policies in early 2006, at which time the signatories to 
the Equator Principles will have to decide how to incorporate the changes. For the reasons stated 
above, the revised policies are unlikely to reflect best practice in most substantive areas. They 
should thus be viewed as a minimum set of standards upon which the Equator Banks can build a 
stronger and more comprehensive environmental and social framework that reflects best 
practice and international standards. 
 
ANNEX 3:  BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES FOR INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
1.  Biological diversity 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar 
Convention) (1971). www.ramsar.org 
 
UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (the World 
Heritage Convention) (1972). www.unesco.org   
 
The Convention to Regulate International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna (CITES) (1973). www.cites.org 
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc.A/CONG.62/122 (1982). 
 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). www.biodiv.org  
 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and the World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre, Guidelines for Protected Area Management Categories (1992). 
 
IUCN Species Survival Commission, Red List for Threatened Species Categories and Criteria 
version 3.1 (2000).  
 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2000). 
 
2.  Chemicals 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987). 
 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal (1989). 
 
Food and Agricultural Organisation, International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use 
of Pesticides (1990).   
 
“The Basel Ban,” Decision II/12, adopted at the Second Conference of the Parties of the Basel 
Convention (1994) (not yet in force). 
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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (1994). www.opcw.org 
 
WHO Recommended Classification of Pesticides by Hazard Classes (1996).  
 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998). www.pic.int 
 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (2000). www.pops.int 
 
OECD Multinational Guidelines on Enterprises (2000). www.oecd.org 
 
3.  Climate change and energy 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) (UNFCCC). www.unfccc.int 
 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997), 
unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol 
 
Carbon Disclosure Project, Carbon Disclosure Project 2005, Third Annual Report (Sept. 2005). 
 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development and World Resources Institute, 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Reporting and Accounting Standard (2004). 
www.ghgprotocol.org 
 
4.  Dams 
World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-
making (2000). www.dams.org 
 
5.  Environmental and social management systems 
International Standardisation Organisation, ISO Series 14000, Environmental Management 
Systems (1996). 
 
International Finance Corporation, Environmental Assessment, O.P. 4.01 (1998). 
 
OECD Multinational Guidelines on Enterprises (2000). www.oecd.org 
 
World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-
making (2000). 
 
The Equator Principles: An Industry Approach for Financial Institutions in Determining, 
Assessing and Managing Environmental and Social Risk in Project Finance (2003). 
www.equator-principles.com 
 
6.  Extractive industries 
International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships (1973). 
www.imo.org 
 
International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other 
Matters (1972). www.londonconvention.org 
 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). www.biodiv.org 
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Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (1992). 
www.ospar.org 
 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997). 
unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol 
 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (2002). www.kimberleyprocess.com 
 
Striking a Better Balance: The World Bank Group and the Extractives Industries. The Final 
Report of the Extractives Industries Review (Dec. 2003). 
 
Global Gas Flaring Reduction Public-Private Partnership, Voluntary Standard for Global Gas 
Flaring and Venting Reduction (2004). 
 
WWF and the Centre for Science in Public Participation, Framework for Responsible Mining: A 
Guide to Evolving Standards (2005). www.frameworkforresponsiblemining.org 
 
International Cyanide Management Code for the Manufacture, Transportation and Use of 
Cyanide in the Production of Gold (2005). www.cyanidecode.org 
 
Global Reporting Initiative, Metals and Mining Sector Supplement, Pilot Version 1.0 (2005). 
 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Sourcebook (2005). www.eitransparency.org 
 
7. Fishing 
The Convention to Regulate International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna (CITES) (1973). www.cites.org 
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc.A/CONG.62/122 (1982). 
 
Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the 
World’s Oceans and Seas, UNGA Res. Nos. 44-225 (1989); 45-197 (1990), 46-215 (1991). 
 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and  Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UN Doc. A/CONF.164/38 (1995) 
(The Straddling Stocks Agreement). 
 
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995). 
 
International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries 
(1998). 
 
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unauthorized and Unreported Fishing (2001). 
 
Marine Stewardship Council, Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fisheries (2002). 
www.msc.org 
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ICCAT, Recommendation Relating to Mediterranean Swordfish, ICCAT Rec. 03-04 (Nov. 
2003). 
 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Recommendation Concerning 
the Conservation of  Sharks Caught in Association with Fisheries Managed by ICCAT (Oct. 
2004). 
 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Resolution on the Conservation of Sharks Caught 
in Association with Fisheries in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, Res. C-05-03 (June 2005). 
 
8.  Forests 
The Convention to Regulate International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna (CITES) (1973). www.cites.org 
 
Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N.Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III) (3-14 June 1992). 
 
Forest Stewardship Council, Principles and Criteria of Forest Stewardship (1996). www.fsc.org 
 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, Principles and Criteria of Sustainable Palm Oil Production 
(2005). 
 
9.  Human rights 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res. 217A(III), 10 Dec.1948. 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA Res. 2200A(XXI),  
16 Dec.1966. 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,  UNGA Res. 2200A(XXI), 16 
Dec.1966. 
 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, (2003). 
 
10.  Indigenous people 
International Labour Organisation, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, Convention No. 
169 (1989). 
 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). www.biodiv.org 
 
UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994). 
 
World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-
making (2000). www.dams.org 
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Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, Commentary, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003) 
 
11.  Labour 
International Labour Organisation, Forced Labour Convention, Convention No. 29 (1930). 
 
International Labour Organisation, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, Convention No. 87 (1948). 
 
International Labour Organisation, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
Convention No. 98 (1949). 
 
International Labour Organisation, Equal Remuneration Convention, Convention No. 100 
(1951).  
 
International Labour Organisation, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, Convention No. 
105 (1957).  
 
International Labour Organisation, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 
Convention No. 111 (1958). 
 
International Labour Organisation, Minimum Age Convention, Convention No. 138 (1973).  
 
International Labour Organisation, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises & Social Policy (Nov. 1977).  
 
International Labour Organisation, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, Convention No. 
182 (1999).  
 
12.  Sustainable agriculture 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2000). 
 
International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements, Basic Standards for Organic 
Production and Processing (2002). 
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ANNEX 4:  EXCLUSION LIST 
As discussed in the text, a number of activities, products or production methods have 
been banned, prohibited or severely curtailed by international treaties or other 
instruments. A strong environmental and social management system would screen out 
these types of activities from financial support. The adoption of an “exclusion list” (see 
below) sends a clear message to potential clients that transactions involving these 
activities would not be supported. 
 
a. Activities deemed illegal under under host country laws or regulations or 
international conventions and agreements;  
b. production or activities involving forced labour, exploitative or harmful 
child labour, or discrimination in the workplace; 
c. production or trade in weapons and munitions; 
d. trade in wildlife or wildlife products regulated as threatened or 
endangered under CITES; 
e. production or trade in radioactive materials; 
f. production or trade in or use of unbonded asbestos fibers; 
g. production or trade in products containing PCBs; 
h. production or trade in pharmaceuticals subject to international phase-outs 
or bans; 
i. production or trade in pesticides/herbicides subject to international bans 
or phase-outs; 
j. production or trade in ozone-depleting substances subject to international 
phase-out; 
k. fishing using drift nets in excess of 2.5km in length or any other fishing 
techniques banned under international law; 
l. projects in or impacting on World Heritage Sites, IUCN Areas I-IV, or 
critical habitat for IUCN Red-Listed species; 
m. projects that will significantly damage non-replicable cultural property; 
n. projects involving the use or production of persistent organic pollutants 
regulated under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants; 
o. projects involving the intentional introduction of alien species into the 
environment; 
p. projects involving the intentional introduction of any living modified 
organism without the prior informed consent of the recipient country; 
q. aquaculture in undisturbed coastal mangrove or wetland areas; 
r. mining projects that use cyanide heap leaching to extract metals; 
s. mining projects that use submarine or riverine tailings disposal to discard 
wastes; 
t. energy sector projects that flare significant amounts of associated gas; 
u. transboundary trade in hazardous wastes; 
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v. production or trade in any activity that risks significant transboundary 
environmental or social impacts without the prior informed consent of 
the other potentially affected country. 
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